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ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN:*  AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF 
BAN-THE-BOX LEGISLATION ON THE 
EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF PEOPLE OF 
COLOR WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 
Lucy Gubernick** 
“Criminals, it turns out, are the one social group in America we 
have permission to hate.” 
– Michelle Alexander1 
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of Cain,’ but contrary to the biblical injunction, God’s mercy isn’t attached.  Rather, 
it shackles former offenders like me with restrictions barring us—often 
permanently—from the means to live a normal life.  Legally, these restrictions are 
called ‘civil disabilities.’  More realistically, they are called ‘civil death,’ a condition 
that, for many of us, offers little option but to return whence we came:  to prison.” 
Webb Hubbell, The Mark of Cain, SFGATE (June 10, 2001, 4:00 AM), 
http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-mark-of-Cain-2910287.php 
[https://perma.cc/A7GL-EPXX].  
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INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2015, Judge John Gleeson of the Eastern District of New 
York expunged the conviction of Jane Doe,2 a low-income mother of 
four, who had been sentenced to five years of probation more than a 
decade earlier for her involvement in an insurance fraud scheme.3  At 
the time of her conviction Doe was working as a home health aide.  
Her criminal record had since made it impossible to find new work in 
                                                                                                                 
 2. A pseudonym. 
 3. See Doe v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 449 (E.D.N.Y. 2015); see also 
Ronald F. Day, Crime and Incarceration:  A Future Fraught With Uncertainty, in 
IMPACT:  COLLECTED ESSAYS ON THE THREAT OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 1, 36 (July 
2015), http://www.nyls.edu/impact-center-for-public-interest-law/publications/ 
[https://perma.cc/34TN-5XHV]. 
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her field.4  In his decision, Judge Gleeson wrote, “I sentenced her to 
five years of probation supervision, not to a lifetime of 
unemployment.”5  In order to make the punishment fit the crime, the 
judge felt it necessary to erase the record of the crime ever 
happening. 
There are over seventy million people in the U.S. with a criminal 
record on file.6  Prison reformers have dubbed the criminal record 
“the mark of Cain” because of its indelible nature and its role as a 
justification for perpetual punishment—namely, exclusion from the 
economic and social spheres of American life.7  This punishment is 
exacerbated by racial prejudice and the real and perceived 
connections between race and criminal justice involvement in this 
country.8  Jane Doe is black and, in the decision, Judge Gleeson 
acknowledged her race as “even more of an impediment to her 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 449-52.  The order was vacated and remanded by 
the Court of Appeals due to lack of jurisdiction. Doe v. United States, 833 F.3d 192 
(2016), cert. denied, No. 16-876, 2017 WL 120912 (May 22, 2017). 
 5. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 457. 
 6. According to a 2012 Department of Justice report, 100.5 million Americans 
have state criminal history records on file.  The National Employment Law Project 
(“NELP”), an advocacy group, has been skeptical of the DOJ’s statistics in the past, 
contending that they are likely an overestimate because they may not account for 
individuals who have records in multiple states.  Thus, NELP has suggested reducing 
the DOJ figures by a generous thirty percent, which—while almost certainly leading 
to an underestimate—still yields a count of 70.3 million individuals with criminal 
records.  For the DOJ data, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL 
HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS 2012 (Jan. 2014), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
bjs/grants/244563.pdf [https://perma.cc/3J2V-4FAT].  For a discussion of NELP’s 
methodology that yields a more conservative estimate using 2008 data, see MICHELLE 
NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L EMP. LAW PROJECT, 65 
MILLION ‘NEED NOT APPLY:’  THE CASE FOR REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND 
CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT (2011), http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_
Million_Need_Not_Apply.pdf [https://perma.cc/DMF8-PRX5].  It is important to 
note that a conviction is not a criminal record prerequisite.  A record is created upon 
arrest, regardless of the ultimate disposition. See JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL 
CRIMINAL RECORD 1 (2015). 
 7. See Webb Hubbell, The Mark of Cain, SFGATE  (June 10, 2001 4:00 AM), 
http://sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-mark-of-Cain-2910287.php 
[https://perma.cc/A7GL-EPXX].  For a comprehensive study of collateral 
consequences, see generally JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, LOCKED OUT:  
FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2006). 
 8. See infra Parts I-II; see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED:  RACE, CRIME, AND 
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 86-100 (2007) [hereinafter 
MARKED]; Sarah Childress, Michelle Alexander:  “A System of Racial and Social 
Control,” PBS:  FRONTLINE (Apr. 29, 2014), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/
article/michelle-alexander-a-system-of-racial-and-social-control/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PM8-LWX7]. 
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employment prospects than her conviction.”9  In the U.S. job market, 
race has effectively become a proxy for criminality.10 
Sociologists have begun to draw attention to the racial disparities 
in both the population “marked” by a criminal record and the civic 
penalties inflicted on that population upon reentry into society.11  
Studies show that the criminal justice system acts as a manufacturer of 
inequality in the labor market.12  The system disproportionately 
convicts and incarcerates people of color and then tracks them for 
further disparate treatment by potential employers, frequently driving 
these individuals to abandon the prospect of a legal job altogether.13  
This authorized cycle of discrimination has, in turn, engendered and 
solidified social biases about what criminality looks like.14  Today, the 
unemployment rate of people with criminal records generally is 
dangerously high,15 but specific attention needs to be paid to the 
unmeasured group of unemployed people of color with criminal 
records. 
As the successful reintegration of the ex-offender population 
becomes an increasingly urgent policy concern, more and more states, 
cities, and counties are implementing “ban-the-box” hiring laws to 
improve the employment outcomes of people with criminal records.16  
Ban-the-box laws aim to provide job candidates with the opportunity 
to put forward their qualifications initially without the stigma of a 
criminal record by prohibiting the conviction history question on 
preliminary job application materials and to delay the moment at 
which an employer can perform a criminal background check.17  Ban-
the-box legislation is important because it addresses the issue of 
discrimination based on criminal background.18  However, given the 
concerns over the specific and intensified discrimination faced by 
unemployed people of color with criminal records, more targeted 
legislation is needed.  Otherwise, the question of how effective ban-
                                                                                                                 
 9. See Doe, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 452. 
 10. See MARKED, supra note 7, at 95; see also infra Part I. 
 11. See infra Part I. 
 12. See Pager, infra note 29. 
 13. See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text. 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See Michelle N. Rodriguez & Beth Avery, Ban the Box:  U.S. Cities, 
Counties, and States Adopt Fair Hiring Policies, NELP (Apr. 1, 2017), 
http://www.nelp.org/publication/ban-the-box-fair-chance-hiring-state-and-local-guide/ 
[https://perma.cc/6PY6-C9YH]. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
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the-box legislation is in terms of benefitting minority groups who are 
most disenfranchised by the criminal justice system and its collateral 
consequences remains.19  This Note argues that there have been 
insufficient data collection efforts to establish and ensure that ban-
the-box legislation will specifically improve the employment 
outcomes of people of color with criminal records.  Further, the laws 
should be written with the explicit purpose of ameliorating the 
collateral consequences of conviction for minorities in order to 
distinguish the future of ban-the-box legislation from past failures in 
antidiscrimination jurisprudence.20 
Part I of this Note explains how criminal records currently operate 
to exclude people—particularly people of color—from the labor 
market.  Part II catalogs the history of laws aimed to remedy the 
unequal impact of criminal record discrimination on people of color 
and the context that led to the ban-the-box movement.  Part II also 
outlines competing sociological theories about whether or not ban-
the-box laws will increase employment outcomes for people of color 
with criminal records, framed by a critical race theory analysis of the 
civil rights law tradition.  Part III presents the limited existing data 
about the effects of ban-the-box legislation and suggests a more 
robust legislative model that will guide and enforce future, useful data 
collection. 
I.  WHY ARE GOVERNMENTS BANNING THE BOX? 
A. Criminal Records in the Labor Market 
Over the past few decades there has been a deliberate “redrawing” 
of American social inequality, influenced and characterized by the 
dramatic rise in the prison and jail populations.21  Sociologists Bruce 
Western and Becky Pettit explain that, although the increase in the 
penal confinement rate is in itself a significant and sinister social 
phenomenon, “the scale of punishment today gains its social force 
from its unequal distribution.”22  People of color—particularly young 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. Bruce Western & Becky Petit, Incarceration & Social Inequality, 139 
DAEDALUS 8, 16 (2010), http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/DAED_
a_00019 [https://perma.cc/T3NZ-R8ME]. 
 22. Id. at 8-9.  The intensity and scope of the inequality in the criminal justice 
system cannot be overstated.  Western and Petit argue that this inequality is at once 
“invisible,” “cumulative,” and “intergenerational.”  It is invisible because it operates 
on populations that typically lie outside official accounts of economic well being, like 
census data.  It is cumulative because the collateral consequences of incarceration are 
“accrued” by those who are already on the lowest rungs of the opportunity structure.  
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black men—make up a disproportionate share of the Americans 
behind bars.23  Black people constitute just thirteen percent of the 
overall population but forty percent of the prison population.24  
Latinos constitute sixteen percent of the American population, 
relative to nineteen percent of the prison population.25  Alarmingly, 
                                                                                                                 
Finally, it is intergenerational because it impacts not just incarcerated or previously 
incarcerated people but also their families and communities. Id. at 8, 12-14. 
 23. According to a 2014 Bureau of Justices Statistics Report: 
black males had higher imprisonment rates than prisoners of other races or 
Hispanic origin within every age group.  Imprisonment rates for black males 
were 3.8 to 10.5 times greater at each age group than white males and 1.4 to 
3.1 times greater than rates for Hispanic males.  The largest disparity 
between white and black male prisoners occurred among incarcerated 
people ages 18 to 19.  Black males (1,072 prisoners per 100,000 black male 
residents ages 18 to 19) were more than 10 times more likely to be in state 
or federal prison than whites (102 per 100,000). 
E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2014, 15 
(Sept. 2015), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf [https://perma.cc/6R8F-
U6JF].  The Bureau of Justice Statistics (“BJS”) uses race and “Hispanic origin” 
distributions from its 2004 Survey of Inmates in State and Federal Correctional 
Facilities to adjust the administrative data from National Prisoner Statistics to reflect 
self-identification of race and “Hispanic origin.” See id.  BJS uses the ethnonym 
“Hispanic” (rather than “Latino,” used in this paper) to refer to a person of Cuban, 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, South or Central American, or other Spanish culture or 
origin regardless of race. See id.  Further, black people constitute thirty percent of 
arrestees and forty-five percent of persons convicted of crimes. See SENTENCING 
PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 22 
(2008), http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracial
disparity.pdf [https://perma.cc/QK4H-7A7J].  While the population of incarcerated 
blacks is overwhelmingly male (over ninety percent) black women are also 
incarcerated at a higher rate than their white counterparts.  For more information 
about the racial makeup of women behind bars, see MARC MAUER, SENTENCING 
PROJECT, THE CHANGING RACIAL DYNAMICS OF WOMEN’S INCARCERATION 1 (Feb. 
2013), http://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-changing-racial-dynamics-
of-womens-incarceration/ [https://perma.cc/KUT8-XCTG].  Black transgender 
people and gender non-conforming people are incarcerated at the highest rate of all. 
See NAT’L CTR. FOR TRANSGENDER EQUAL., A BLUEPRINT FOR EQUALITY:  PRISON 
AND DETENTION REFORM (2012), http://www.transequality.org/sites/default/files/
docs/resources/NCTE_Blueprint_for_Equality2012_Prison_Reform.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/UX22-5C46].  Nearly forty-seven percent of black transgender 
people are incarcerated at some point during their lifetime. See id. 
 24. LEAH SAKALA, BREAKING DOWN MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 2010 CENSUS:  
STATE-BY-STATE INCARCERATE RATES BY RACE/ETHNICITY (May 2014), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/rates.html [https://perma.cc/32LR-A46V] (using 
2010 Census data); see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS:  UNITED STATES 
(2010), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00 [https://perma.cc/
WS3Z-ME26] (corresponding census data).  More up to date federal prison race and 
ethnicity statistics are available at FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, Inmate Statistics (Mar. 
2017), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_age.jsp [https://perma.
cc/SZU6-8TH7]. 
 25. See SAKALA supra note 24; see also U.S. CENSUS BUREAU supra note 24. 
2017] ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN 1159 
the Justice Department has estimated that one third of black men and 
nearly a fifth of Latino men born in 2001 will go to prison in their 
lifetime.26  Prejudiced criminal justice policies and racial profiling, not 
disproportionate minority crime rates, account for the high numbers 
of blacks and Latinos locked up.27  Only very recently have 
researchers begun to take stock of the impact of the intense racial 
disparities in the incarcerated population on the myriad collateral 
consequences that population suffers upon release.28  According to 
Sociologist Devah Pager, who implemented an experiment in 2003 to 
test the role of criminal records in hiring discrimination, “the 
connections are in thinking about the criminal justice system as an 
increasingly important mechanism for generating racial inequality in 
the labor market.”29  Pager’s experiment highlighted the correlation 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Thomas P. Bonczar, Prevalence of Imprisonment in the US Population, 1974-
2001, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT 1 (2003), http://www.bjs.gov/
content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf [https://perma.cc/A7ZH-BH6Y]. 
 27. See Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box But Keeping The Discrimination?:  
Disparate Impact and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 199 (2014).  This point is best demonstrated through 
the disparate treatment of people of color in the war on drugs.  A June 2013 report 
by the American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) found that although white and 
black Americans use marijuana at similar rates, a black person was nearly four times 
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than a white person across all 
states (in the states with the worst disparities, blacks were on average over six times 
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than whites). See ACLU, THE 
WAR ON MARIJUANA IN BLACK AND WHITE:  BILLIONS OF DOLLARS WASTED ON 
RACIALLY BIASED ARRESTS 9, 17, 21 (June 2013), https://www.aclu.org/report/report-
war-marijuana-black-and-white [https://perma.cc/4WB4-G3TW]; see also NAZGOL 
GHANDNOOSH, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT:  RACIAL 
PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME AND SUPPORT FOR PUNITIVE POLICIES (2014), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Race-and-
Punishment.pdf [https://perma.cc/YNT9-EBYS] (explaining how the war on drugs 
and overt racial bias in policing leads to disproportionate arrests and convictions of 
people of color).  For a detailed explanation of how the real and perceived 
intersections between race and criminality in the U.S. developed, see generally 
KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD, THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS:  RACE, CRIME 
AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN AMERICA (2011). 
 28. Michelle Alexander is famous for describing this phenomenon as the “new 
Jim Crow” in her 2010 book. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 1. 
 29. Kai Wright, Boxed In:  How a Criminal Record Keeps You Unemployed For 
Life, NATION (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/boxed-how-criminal-
record-keeps-you-unemployed-life/ [https://perma.cc/67BV-PPA9] (quoting Devah 
Pager).  Pager writes in her study, “No longer a peripheral institution, the criminal 
justice system has become a dominant presence in the lives of young disadvantaged 
men, playing a key role in the sorting and stratifying of labor market opportunities.” 
Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 962 (Mar. 2003), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/Reference%20Media/Pager_2003_Crime%2
0and%20the%20Legal%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/QT4M-KZ2D].  Bruce Western 
and Kathryn Beckett have also called the criminal justice system a “labor market 
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between the disparate treatment of race by the criminal justice system 
and the later disparate treatment of race by employers evaluating job 
applicants with records.30 
Pager refers to a person’s criminal record as a “negative credential” 
because of the extremely high barrier it poses to employment.31  Her 
study used an experimental audit approach based on “matched pairs” 
of specially trained black and white men who applied for hundreds of 
entry-level, low-wage jobs in Milwaukee in the summer of 2001.32  
The applicants were randomly assigned resumes that showed identical 
work experience and education, but one of the two indicated recent 
employment in prison and listed a parole officer as a reference.33  
Pager recorded whether employers called back to offer a job or 
schedule a second-round interview.  The study’s aim was to determine 
the extent to which a criminal record (in the absence of other 
disqualifying characteristics) serves as an obstacle to employment.  
Out of the pool of subjects, thirty-four percent of white applicants 
without a criminal record were given a callback compared to 
seventeen percent of white applicants with a criminal record.34  That 
is, having a criminal record reduced a white job applicant’s success by 
half.35  Even more alarming, was that the seventeen percent of white 
applicants with criminal records given callbacks was still higher than 
the fourteen percent of black applicants without criminal records who 
were given callbacks.36  And only a meager five percent of black 
applicants with criminal records were given callbacks.37  Therefore, 
the study revealed even greater racial discrimination in hiring 
                                                                                                                 
institution.” See Bruce Western & Katherine Beckett, How Unregulated is the U.S. 
Labor Market?  The Penal System as a Labor Market Institution, 104 AM. J. SOC. 
1030, 1052 (Jan. 1999), http://politics.as.nyu.edu/docs/IO/4756/western.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5LJG-PFY7]. 
 30. Pager, supra note 29, at 956. 
 31. Id. at 942.  Pager identifies the “credentialing” power of the criminal justice 
system, which operates by institutionally branding a particular class of individuals 
“with implications for their perceived place in the stratification order.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 945-46. 
 33. All the applicants were twenty-three-year-old college students who were 
matched on the basis of physical appearance and general style of self-presentation. 
Id. at 947.  The applicant posing as a previously incarcerated person disclosed in the 
interview that he had served an eighteen-month prison term for a drug crime. Id. at 
959. 
 34. Id. at 955. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 958. 
 37. Id.  Pager’s study shows that a criminal record halved a white applicant’s 
chances, but reduced a black applicant’s chance by two-thirds.  In other words, 
criminal records hurt black candidates more than white candidates. 
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practices than conviction-based discrimination.  Responding to 
Pager’s findings, Ta-Nehisi Coates wrote:  “Effectively, the job 
market in America regards black men who have never been criminals 
as though they were.”38  This pervasive prejudice among hiring 
authorities is tied up in stereotypes of criminality that assume39—and 
ultimately, contribute to40—links between race and ex-offender 
status. 
In most jurisdictions the social stigma associated with a criminal 
record is compounded by legally mandated discrimination based on 
that criminal record.41  People with certain past criminal justice 
involvement are excluded by law—temporarily or permanently—
from a variety of jobs in the public and private sectors, running the 
gamut from ambulance drivers to septic tank cleaners.42  Further, 
even when discrimination is not legally required, most states allow 
employers and occupational licensing agencies to obtain the full 
criminal records of job applicants and to use that information in 
hiring at their discretion.43 
Pager explains that the criminal record as a source of labor market 
inequality is so nefarious because it is a mechanism of discrimination 
and social exclusion that is sanctioned and designed by the state.44  
Employment satisfies a basic and fundamental need for a human to 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Black Family in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 
ATLANTIC (Oct. 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/10/the-
black-family-in-the-age-of-mass-incarceration/403246/ [https://perma.cc/Y488-
5ANC]. 
 39. See GHANDNOOSH, supra note 27, at 3 (“White Americans overestimate the 
proportion of crime committed by people of color, and associate people of color with 
criminality.  For example, white respondents in a 2010 survey overestimated the 
actual share of burglaries, illegal drug sales, and juvenile crime committed by African 
Americans by 20-30%.  In addition, implicit bias research has uncovered widespread 
and deep-seated tendencies among whites—including criminal justice practitioners—
to associate blacks and Latinos with criminality.”). 
 40. See infra note 48. 
 41. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 42. See infra Section II.A.2; see also Bruce E. May, The Character Component of 
Occupational Licensing Laws:  A Continuing Barrier to the Ex-Felon’s Employment 
Opportunities, 71 N.D. L. REV. 187, 190 (1995). 
 43. See infra Section II.A.3. 
 44. Pager, supra note 29, at 942 (“The ‘negative credential’ associated with a 
criminal record represents a unique mechanism of stratification, in that it is the state 
that certifies particular individuals in ways that qualify them for discrimination or 
social exclusion.  It is this official status of the negative credential that differentiates it 
from other sources of social stigma, offering greater legitimacy to its use as the basis 
for differentiation.”). 
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be self-sufficient and contribute to society at large.45  For that reason, 
it has been shown to be a person’s primary concern upon release from 
incarceration.46  But time behind bars impedes the accumulation of 
work experience, prevents the maintenance of social networks that 
aid in job searches, and tends to lead to the erosion of marketable 
skills, on top of qualifying individuals for discrimination and social 
exclusion.47  The significant barrier to the legal labor market posed by 
a criminal record frequently pushes previously convicted people to 
find alternative sources of income, often outside of the law.48  These 
alternative income sources include a shadow economy of part time 
labor—similar to the one that exploits undocumented workers—that 
provides low wages with little if any benefits, putting strain on 
laborers and the families they support.49  Pager writes “in our frenzy 
of locking people up, our ‘crime control’ policies may in fact 
exacerbate the very conditions that led to crime in the first place.”50  
Unsurprisingly, deprivation of stable work is one of the strongest 
predictors of recidivism.51 
                                                                                                                 
 45. ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 148.  Inability to find work can lead to 
behavioral and mental health effects like depression and proclivity for violence, 
particularly among men. Id. at 149. 
 46. MARTA NELSON, PERRY DEESS & CHARLOTTE ALLEN, VERA INST., THE FIRST 
MONTH OUT:  POST-INCARCERATION EXPERIENCES IN NEW YORK CITY 13 (Sept. 
1999), http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/first_month_
out.pdf [https://perma.cc/NRM6-2B67]. 
 47. JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME:  PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY 4, 22-23 (2003). 
 48. This is partially due to the fact that a criminal record often adds to the already 
“problematic profile” of an applicant who has little or no preparation for the 
workforce. See ALEXANDER, supra note 1, at 150.  Poverty, limited education, mental 
illness, and addiction are all factors that increase a person’s risk of ending up behind 
bars. See id.  According to one study, nearly half of the offender and ex-offender 
populations are functionally illiterate. See id. (citing JEREMY TRAVIS, AMY SOLOMON 
& MICHELLE WAUL, FROM PRISON TO HOME:  THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF PRISONER REENTRY (2001)). 
 49. See generally MERCER L. SULLIVAN, “GETTING PAID:”  YOUTH CRIME AND 
WORK IN THE INNER CITY (1989); Bruce Western, The Impact of Incarceration on 
Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526 (Aug. 2002); see also Wright, 
supra note 29.  A 2010 Pew Charitable Trust study found that for men, having been 
incarcerated reduces hourly wages by eleven percent and reduces annual earnings by 
forty percent. See PEW CHARITABLE TRS., COLLATERAL COSTS:  INCARCERATION’S 
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4 (2010), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/0001/01/01/collateral-costs [https://perma.cc/NJ2Y-EU4Q]. 
 50. Pager, supra note 29, at 961. 
 51. Id. at 939; see Mark T. Berg & Beth M. Huebner, Reentry and the Ties That 
Bind:  An Examination of Social Ties, Employment, and Recidivism, 28 JUST. Q. 382, 
398 (Apr. 2011), http://www.pacific-gateway.org/reentry,%20employment%20and%20
recidivism.pdf [https://perma.cc/9TMZ-DZ5C] (showing that two years after release 
ex-offenders who were employed were nearly half as likely to face arrest or 
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Hiring discrimination against people with criminal records, 
concentrated in minority communities, has led to rampant joblessness 
with profound effects on the U.S. economy and social welfare.  
Neither the Federal Bureau of Prisons, nor the Department of Labor, 
nor any state or federal prison tracks the unemployment rate of ex-
offenders, but studies have estimated that it is between twenty-five 
and forty percent.52  Estimates of lost productivity due to joblessness 
and the post-conviction, secondary labor market total as much as 
sixty-five billion dollars per year in terms of gross domestic product 
(not including the high costs of incarceration and recidivism).53  
Today, we are more aware of the dismal racial disparities in 
American employment:  the joblessness rate is just over thirteen 
percent for blacks—nearly double that of white workers, and 
comparable to the national rate during the Great Depression—and 
just below ten percent for Latinos.54  But, traditionally, the criminal 
justice system has served to efface the real effect of race on 
employment and poverty statistics by omitting incarcerated 
populations from census counts.55  Even now there is still no official 
                                                                                                                 
conviction); see also Christopher Uggen & Jeremy Staff, Work as a Turning Point for 
Criminal Offenders, 5 CORR. MGMT. Q. 1, 14 (2001), http://users.soc.umn.edu/
~uggen/Uggen_Staff_CMQ_01.pdf [https://perma.cc/BKT2-8SRK] (claiming that 
“employment remains a viable avenue for reducing crime and recidivism” and finding 
strong correlations between increased employment and reduced recidivism, 
particularly for older ex-offenders). 
 52. See PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 119.  The unemployment rates of ex-
offenders are particularly high within the first few years out.  In California, for 
example, it is estimated that as many as eighty percent of ex-offenders remain jobless 
a year after being released from prison. See id. 
 53. JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POL’Y RES., EX-
OFFENDERS AND THE LABOR MARKET (2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/
ex-offenders-2010-11.pdf [https://perma.cc/97BB-862M].  In 2008 the Center for 
Economic Policy and Research calculated that the population of people with felony 
convictions lowered the official employment rate among all men as much as 1.7 
percentage points. See id. at 1. 
 54. See Wright, supra note 29. 
 55. “The idea of “invisible inequality” is explained in the work Bruce Western 
and Becky Petit. See Western & Petit, supra note 21.  Their study shows that 
unemployment rates—as they are conventionally measured by the Current 
Population Survey, the large monthly labor force survey conducted by the Census 
Bureau—do not measure the incarcerated population and, thus, drastically 
underestimate the rate of unemployment, especially of young black men.  This is 
because the current Population Survey is drawn on a sample of households, so those 
who are institutionalized are not included in the survey-based description of the 
population. See id. at 12.  When Western recalculated the employment rates for 
young black men without a high school diploma in 2008, he found that the percent of 
such individuals with jobs dropped from forty to twenty-five percent. See id.  
According to Ta-Nehisi Coates, “[t]he illusion of wage and employment progress 
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comprehensive data collected about the unemployment rates of ex-
offenders, let alone specific data about racial minorities with 
records.56  This perpetuated political legacy of invisibility reflects the 
entrenched and calculated connections between race and criminality 
in this country’s opportunity structure. 
II.  THE NEGATIVE CREDENTIAL AND RACE 
A. The Legal History That Gave Rise to the Need for States to  
Ban-the-Box 
This Part describes the legal history and context that produced the 
need for ban-the-box legislation to protect people of color with 
criminal records.  Section 1 shows the chronology of Title VII 
disparate-impact litigation and judicial interpretation.  Section 2 
explains the legally mandated employment discrimination against 
people with records.  Section 3 details the rise of the criminal 
background check industry, its regulation by the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (“FCRA”), and how the industry has exploited racial 
biases shared by many employers about ex-offenders in the labor 
market.  Each of these individual narratives—along with political 
context—contributed to a systemic failure by the legal apparatus to 
protect the groups most vulnerable to criminal record discrimination.  
The ban-the-box movement, as the product of these narratives, is 
introduced in Section 4.  There, this Note explores how the 
motivating historical forces behind the ban-the-box laws signal 
potential issues in their designs. 
1. History of Federal Court Treatment of Disparate Impact 
Challenges to Employers’ Criminal Record Policies 
Federal civil rights law was the first legal measure used to attempt 
to counteract the structural racism inherent in hiring discrimination 
against people with criminal records.  This measure plays out through 
an ironic logic:  because the criminal justice system is proven to 
disproportionately convict and incarcerate people of color, certain 
forms of discrimination by employers against job applicants with 
criminal records are prohibited under the disparate impact provision 
of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.57  While in the 1970s and 
                                                                                                                 
among African American males was made possible only through the erasure of the 
most vulnerable among them from the official statistics.” See Coates, supra note 38. 
 56. See PETERSILIA, supra note 47, at 119. 
 57. See Michael Connett, Comment, Employer Discrimination against Individuals 
with A Criminal Record:  The Unfulfilled Role of State Fair Employment Agencies, 
83 TEMP. L. REV. 1007, 1010 (2011).  While Title VII ”does not prohibit 
2017] ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN 1165 
early 1980s Title VII suits involving employers’ consideration of 
arrest and conviction records had “mixed results,” over time, the 
success rate for plaintiffs in such suits has plummeted.58 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire 
an individual because of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.”59  An employer does not need to intentionally discriminate to 
violate the law.60  Even a policy that is neutral on its face will run 
afoul of Title VII if the negative consequences fall too harshly on a 
protected class and the policy is not related to the job at issue or 
consistent with “business necessity.”61  The disparate impact theory 
was first adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., where the Court found that an employer’s requirements that 
applicants possess a high school diploma and pass a general 
intelligence test were not permissible under Title VII.62  There, the 
Court held that “any [hiring] tests used must measure the person for 
the job and not the person in the abstract.”63  Thus, the Court 
established an important antidiscrimination safeguard by interpreting 
Title VII to require employers who use a hiring method with a 
                                                                                                                 
discrimination on the basis of criminal history per se,” people who have been rejected 
for jobs or fired because of their criminal records have pursued discrimination claims 
indirectly by alleging that facially neutral inquiries about criminal records 
disproportionately disadvantage black and Latino applicants. See Alexandra Harwin, 
Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with 
Criminal Records, 14 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 5 (2012). 
 58. Harwin, supra note 57, at 5.  Harwin notes that while in the 1970s and early 
1980s disparate impact claims were “among the most successful Title VII suits 
brought by ex-offenders,” in no case since the late 1980s has a plaintiff won after a 
trial on the merits. Id. at 6 n.59. 
 59. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). 
 60. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
 61. Id. at 430-31.  Title VII targets two different types of discrimination:  
“disparate treatment,” which includes employer practices that are motivated in whole 
or in part by intentional discrimination against a protected class, and “disparate 
impact,” which includes facially neutral employer practices that disproportionately 
harm members of a protected class. See Harwin, supra note 57 at 5.  In Griggs the 
Court tangentially defined “business necessity” as an employment practice that can 
“be shown to be related to job performance.” Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. 
 62. In Griggs, the NAACP’s Legal Defense and Education Fund (“LDF”) 
represented a group of thirteen black Duke Power Co. employees.  The company had 
a long history of segregating employees by race, relegating black employees to the 
“labor department,” with the lowest paid jobs.  Shortly after Congress passed Title 
VII, Duke Power Co. stopped expressly restricting black employees to the labor 
department.  Instead, the company implemented IQ tests and required a high school 
diploma for non-labor department jobs, despite the fact that it had never imposed 
any such employment criteria previously. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426-27. 
 63. Id. at 436. 
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discriminatory impact to shoulder the burden of proving that the 
method fulfills a genuine business need and is a valid measure of an 
applicant’s ability to learn or perform the job in question. 
Today, disparate impact claims are analyzed under a three step, 
burden-shifting framework codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.64  
First, the plaintiff must establish that the employer’s facially neutral 
employment practice has a significantly adverse impact on a protected 
class.65  Second, if the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of 
discrimination, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to 
demonstrate that the challenged policy was a business necessity.66  
Third, the plaintiff can still prevail by demonstrating that the reason 
offered by the defendant is a pretext.67  The plaintiff typically proves 
this by showing that there is an alternative policy that avoids the 
disproportionately harsh negative impacts on the protected class.68 
In order to allege that an employer’s hiring policy discriminates on 
the basis of applicants’ criminal histories, the injured party must begin 
by filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (“EEOC”), the federal agency charged with enforcing 
the dictates of Title VII.69  If the EEOC determines that there is 
“reasonable cause” that the claimant suffered actionable 
discrimination, then the agency will see the case through mediation, 
                                                                                                                 
 64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.  The three-part burden-shifting framework was originally 
adopted in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green before it was later codified in the 
Civil Rights Act. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 65. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). 
 66. Id.  In Griggs, the Court emphasized that the employer is required to 
demonstrate that “any given [employment] requirement must have a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question” or have a “demonstrable relationship to 
successful performance of the jobs for which [the practice is] used.” Griggs, 401 U.S. 
at 431-32.  The meaning of business necessity has changed dramatically over the years 
in Supreme Court opinions. See generally, Andrew Spiropoulos, Defining the 
Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action:  Finding the 
Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1478 (1995) (discussing the meaning of business 
necessity and how the Supreme Court has altered the burden on employers to 
demonstrate business necessity over time); Kelsey Sullivan, Risky Business:  
Determining the Business Necessity of Criminal Background Checks 24 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 501 (2014) (examining what has constituted a business necessity defense for 
employers who use background checks in a way that has a disparate impact on 
minorities). 
 67. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b)(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Christina O’Connell, Ban the Box:  A Call to the Federal Government to 
Recognize A New Form of Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 
2810 (2015). 
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arbitration, or litigation.70  If the EEOC does not take the case, the 
claimant is issued a Notice of Right-to-Sue, which grants them 
permission to file a lawsuit themselves.71 
In the 1970s and early 1980s, before Congress codified the three 
part framework, disparate impact claims brought by people with 
criminal records found moderate success in the federal courts with the 
help of the EEOC.72  Many of these claims succeeded because federal 
courts were fairly flexible in the type and quantity of statistical 
evidence they accepted as sufficient to meet a prima facie case of 
adverse impact on a protected class and judges looked skeptically 
upon employers’ defenses about business necessity and job-
relatedness.73 
The favorable treatment of such cases stemmed from a 1975 Eighth 
Circuit decision, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.74  There, 
Buck Green, a black job applicant, brought a Title VII claim against 
the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company (“MoPac”) for refusing to 
hire any person who had been convicted of a criminal offense other 
                                                                                                                 
 70. Id.  The EEOC also issues guidance on federal employment law to enforce 
Title VII. See, e.g., OFF. OF LEGAL COUNSEL, U.S. EEOC, EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN 
EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 
(2012), http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PXZ8-LSJR] [hereinafter EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 
915.002]. 
 71. O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2810. 
 72. Harwin, supra note 57, at 6. 
 73. Id.  For example, in Gregory v. Litton Systems, Inc., the court was satisfied 
with general population statistics showing proportionally higher rates of arrests and 
convictions of racial minorities. 316 F. Supp. 401, 403 (C.D. Cal. 1970).  Still, at that 
time, the majority of successful claims involved challenging automatic and absolute 
bans to employment based on criminal records and, even then, plaintiffs lost more 
frequently than they won. Harwin, supra note 57, at 5, 10.  For another “golden age,” 
plaintiff-friendly case, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 102, 498 F. 
Supp. 952, 965 (D.D.C. 1980) (invalidating the use of arrest records as “knock-out” 
criteria).  For an unfavorable plaintiff outcome, see, e.g., Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 
F. Supp. 1283, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (finding that the plaintiff’s failure to produce 
applicant flow data—statistics comparing the racial composition of the employer’s 
employees to its applicants—was fatal to his claim that the Postal Service’s refusal to 
hire people with criminal convictions disparately impacted minority applicants).  In 
particular, the courts struck down most challenges to employers’ discretionary use of 
conviction records (as opposed to a blanket exclusion). See Harwin, supra note 57, at 
9.  Another source of discrepancy in the outcomes of the cases revolved around the 
use of arrest records—which the courts reviewed more critically—as opposed to 
conviction records. See id. 
 74. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975); see O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2810. 
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than a minor traffic violation.75  Green argued that the absolute bar in 
MoPac’s employment policy had a disparate impact on blacks and did 
not relate to job performance.76  MoPac countered that the policy was 
a business necessity because of concerns about theft, negligent 
liability, and employment disruption.77  The Eighth Circuit upheld 
Green’s Title VII claim, overruling the district court.78  The Eighth 
Circuit first found that Green had established a prima facie case of 
adverse impact based on general statistics including national data on 
black and white conviction rates, in addition to the company’s 
applicant flow data.79  Second, the court held that MoPac did not 
meet the burden for the business necessity defense because it had 
failed to provide any empirical validation to justify its job 
requirements.80  On remand, the district court entered an injunction, 
subsequently affirmed by the Eighth Circuit, stating that, in terms of 
business necessity, the employer could consider an applicant’s 
criminal history in the screening process only “so long as the 
defendant takes into account the nature and gravity of the offense or 
offenses, the time that has passed since the conviction and/or 
completion of sentence, and the nature of the job for which the 
applicant has applied.”81  In other words, the court enforced a strict 
business necessity requirement in regards to employer consideration 
of applicants’ conviction records. 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Green, 523 F.2d at 1292.  Green filed the suit on November 7, 1972 after 
already filing discrimination charges with the EEOC.  The EEOC also filed suit 
against the defendant on April 5, 1973, on the basis of the plaintiff’s charges.  The 
court dismissed the EEOC’s suit because of the plaintiff’s previous filing pursuant to 
an EEOC Right-to-Sue Notice, thus relegating the EEOC to permissive intervention 
in the original suit. See EEOC v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 493 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1974). 
 76. Green, 523 F.2d at 1292-93. 
 77. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811 (citing Green, 523 F.2d. at 1298). 
 78. Green, 523 F.2d. at 1299. 
 79. In Green, the court recognized statistical data and treatises offered into 
evidence by the plaintiff which indicated that, at that time, blacks were convicted of 
crimes “at a rate at least two to three times greater than the percentage of blacks in 
the populations of certain geographical areas.” Id. at 1294.  The court also relied on 
the testimony of an expert witness for the plaintiff, Dr. Ronald Christensen, who 
concluded that, at the time, it was “between 2.2 and 6.7 times as likely that a black 
person will have a criminal conviction record during his lifetime than that a white 
person will have such a record.” Id.; see also Hill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 522 F. Supp. 
1283, 1301 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (defining applicant flow data). 
 80. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811 (citing Green, 523 F.2d at 1298). 
 81. See Smith, supra note 27, at 204 (quoting Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 549 F.2d 
1158, 1160 (8th Cir. 1977)).  These three factors—(1) the nature and gravity of the 
offense(s); (2) the time that has passed since the conviction and/or completion of the 
sentence; and (3) the nature of the job held or sought—have become known as the 
“Green Factors.” See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70. 
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The relative frequency of successful cases like Green during early 
disparate impact litigation can be at least partially attributed to the 
efforts of the EEOC.  In the 1970s, the EEOC was involved in many 
authoritative cases contesting employers’ use of arrest and conviction 
records—often carrying the suit by itself on behalf of an impacted 
person.82  During the 1980s, the EEOC looked to the established 
plaintiff-friendly disparate impact jurisprudence while developing its 
official stance on the issues arising in these cases, including the types 
of statistical proof required to demonstrate disparate impact and the 
appropriate business necessity analysis.83  The agency issued a myriad 
of enforcement guidelines, policy interpretations, and compliance 
manuals firmly establishing the argument that job applicants of color 
are adversely and disproportionately impacted by employers’ use of 
arrest and conviction records—and prohibiting any such conduct 
without business necessity as a categorical rule.84  The EEOC also 
recognized a rebuttable presumption of the discriminatory impact of 
such policies, therefore relieving job applicants of the legal and 
financial burdens of producing their own statistical proof when they 
filed claims with the agency.85  While the EEOC possesses only the 
                                                                                                                 
 82. See, e.g., EEOC v. Guar. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 561 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1977); 
EEOC v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974); EEOC v. Riss 
Int’l Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1094 (W.D. Mo. 1981); EEOC v. Local 638, 401 F. Supp. 467 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).  The EEOC lacked litigation authority prior to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. See Harwin, supra note 57, at n.41. 
 83. Harwin, supra note 57, at 9-10.  For cases where business necessity is at issue, 
the EEOC has employed an analysis that is particularly favorable to plaintiffs.  This 
analysis (which was originally even more plaintiff-friendly) was amended in 1985 to 
“require employers to engage in a holistic inquiry about the nature and gravity of the 
offense, the time since conviction or completion of the sentence, and the nature of 
the job.” Id. at 11.  In instances where the plaintiff challenges policies based on arrest 
records (as opposed to conviction records), the EEOC advantages plaintiffs by calling 
on employers to “assess the likelihood that a candidate had actually committed the 
crime for which he had been arrested, by ‘examin[ing] the surrounding circumstances, 
offer[ing] the applicant or employee an opportunity to explain, and, if he or she 
denies engaging in the conduct, mak[ing] the follow-up inquiries necessary to 
evaluate his/her credibility.’” Id. (quoting EEOC, NOTICE 915.061 (Sept. 7, 1990), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/arrest_records.html [https://perma.cc/78PN-
KNQA]. 
 84. Harwin, supra note 57, at 10. See, e.g., U.S. EEOC, CONVICTION RECORDS 
(Feb. 4, 1987), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict1.html [https://perma.cc/
P9HQ-ZR9A] [hereinafter EEOC CONVICTION RECORDS]. 
 85. “[T]he Commission’s underlying position [is] that an employer’s policy or 
practice of excluding individuals from employment on the basis of their conviction 
records has an adverse impact on blacks and Hispanics in light of statistics showing 
that they are convicted at a rate disproportionately greater than their representation 
in the population.” See EEOC CONVICTION RECORDS, supra note 84.  This 
presumption leaves it up to the employer “to present more narrow local, regional, or 
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limited power to persuade federal court decisions, in the 1970s and 
the early 1980s the judiciary repeatedly deferred to the agency’s 
interpretation of Title VII, leading to plaintiffs’ success in multiple 
cases.86 
Apart from the contributions of the EEOC, the “golden age” of 
criminal history disparate impact litigation was also the result of 
initial, progressive judicial interpretation of the legislative intent of 
Title VII.  The early decisions reflected the then-dominant belief that 
Title VII is a broad-based prophylactic measure87 to “achieve equality 
of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated 
in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over 
other employees.”88  During that time, federal judges played an 
inflated role in determining the scope of disparate impact liability, 
implementing ambiguous standards, later codified by Congress, that 
afforded them considerable discretion—remaining to this day—in 
assessing whether parties have met their individual burdens.89  
Because of this discretion, when the Civil Rights Movement waned 
and the ideology of the judiciary became increasingly conservative, 
the federal courts began to uniformly reject plaintiffs’ challenges to 
employers’ criminal records policies.90 
Since the 1980s plaintiffs have lost almost every disparate impact 
case about the consideration of criminal records in hiring practices, 
                                                                                                                 
applicant flow data, showing that the policy probably will not have an adverse impact 
on its applicant pool and/or in fact does not have an adverse impact on the pool.” 
Harwin, supra note 57, at 10. 
 86. See, e.g., Davis v. City of Dallas, 777 F.2d 205, 209 (5th Cir. 1985); Albemarle 
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c)).  The 
federal courts have the final word in interpreting the meaning of Title VII, and courts 
defer to the EEOC’s decisions only insofar as they are persuasive. See Harwin, supra 
note 57, at 11.  As the Supreme Court explained in Gilbert v. General Electric Co., 
“[t]he weight [accorded to the EEOC’s] judgment in a particular case will depend 
upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its 
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 429 U.S. 125, 140-42 (1976). 
 87. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 449 (1982). 
 88. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971). 
 89. Smith, supra note 27, at 204-05 (citing Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII 
Disparate Impact:  The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the Ideologies of 
Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 268-70 (2005)).  In particular, the Court 
developed arbitrary and convoluted tests for distinguishing between disparate impact 
and disparate treatment.  When the political leaning of the judiciary changed, these 
standards made it difficult for plaintiffs to demonstrate discrimination that is not 
intentional on its face. Id. at 205. 
 90. Id.; see also Harwin, supra note 57, at 12. 
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“with judges frequently awarding summary judgment to employers.”91  
The federal courts have made Title VII claims harder to bring by 
increasing the plaintiff’s burden for establishing a prima facie case 
and have radically relaxed the standards for employers to prove 
business necessity and job-relatedness.92  In fact, judicial opinions 
have expressed particular hostility toward disparate impact claims 
brought by plaintiffs with criminal records.93  One Florida court even 
held that such a claim went against the very purpose of Title VII by 
arguing that denying employers the ability to discriminate based on 
criminal records works to “stigmatize minorities by saying, in effect, 
your group is not as honest as other groups.”94  The court went on to 
advise, “[i]f Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because 
they have been convicted of theft . . . then they should stop 
                                                                                                                 
 91. Harwin, supra note 57, at 12 (citing Caston v. Methodist Med. Ctr. of Ill., 215 
F. Supp. 2d 1002 (C.D. Ill. 2002); McCraven v. City of Chicago, 18 F. Supp. 2d 877 
(N.D. Ill. 1998); and Brown v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), in 
which none of the plaintiffs won after a trial on the merits).  In part, the high loss rate 
reflected the fact that over fifty percent of the cases were brought pro se. See id. at 
12.  In not one case did a pro se litigant survive a motion to dismiss or for summary 
judgment; procedural defects were generally to blame. See id. (citing Wendy 
Parker, Lessons in Losing:  Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 889 (2006)). 
 92. See Harwin, supra note 57, at 14; see also Smith, supra note 27, at 205-12.  It 
was in the Court’s decision Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio that the disparate 
impact doctrine was most severely limited. 490 U.S. 642 (1989); see also infra note 
102.  In general, courts have increased the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden by rejecting 
the argument that a policy of not hiring persons with criminal backgrounds is racially 
discriminatory given the disproportionate representation of minorities in the prison 
population. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2811-12; see, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 
961 F. Supp. 2d 783, 798 (D. Md. 2013) (holding that for a plaintiff to meet its prima 
facie showing of disparate impact, the statistics used “must be representative of the 
relevant applicant pool” and not the population at large, as the EEOC had done in 
that case and in the past).  In conjunction with courts’ increased requirements from 
plaintiffs since the 1980s, employers’ business necessity defenses have been viewed 
with less and less scrutiny. See Harwin, supra note 57, at 14-15; see, e.g., Williams v. 
Scott, 1992 WL 229849 at *2 (ND. Ill. Sept. 9, 1992) (disavowing any scrutiny of the 
business necessity defense, claiming, “[i]t really requires nothing more than the 
statement of [the employer’s] policy to explain its business justification.”).  
Additionally, where courts had once taken particular care to distinguish between 
arrests and convictions in hiring policies, after the 1980s, “they had no qualms about 
upholding employer policies that disqualified applicants or employees based on 
arrests that had never resulted in convictions.” Harwin, supra note 57 (citing Ramos 
v. EquiServe, Inc., 146 F. App’x 565 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
 93. Harwin, supra note 57, at 13. 
 94. EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 
1989). 
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stealing.”95  Needless to say, federal courts have ceased finding the 
EEOC’s guidelines persuasive.96 
The story of the shift in the federal courts’ treatment of criminal 
history disparate impact cases tracks a change in federal courts’ 
attitude toward Title VII generally, and further, a larger judicial and 
political trend to look skeptically on the idea that racial 
discrimination is a systematic generator of social and economic 
disadvantage, instead choosing to view it as a characterization of 
isolated incidents of animus on the part of bad actors.97  Originally, in 
Griggs and other early Title VII disparate impact cases, the Supreme 
Court established precedent that, at least in theory,98 presumed 
discrimination absent another compelling explanation for employer 
conduct.99  But, over time, this presumption disappeared entirely.100  
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id.  This assertion by the court flies in the face of the multiple sources of data 
that suggest that disproportionate representation of minorities in prisons is due to 
over policing and discriminatory sentencing policies and not higher instances of 
crime. 
 96. See Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise:  The Supreme Court and the 
EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1959 (2006). 
 97. See generally Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination:  The Reality 
of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J., 279 (1997).  This trend can be tracked 
along equal protection case law and antidiscrimination litigation generally, spanning 
legal issues from the death penalty, to criminal law, affirmative action, and voting 
rights.  For example, the Court’s treatment of the death penalty reflects a similar 
trajectory of dismantling antidiscrimination protections to reject the concept of 
structural racism.  In Furman v. Georgia the Court held that the death penalty was 
unconstitutional with concurring justices citing racial discrimination as a justification 
for ending the penalty. 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).  Justice Marshall, citing statistics 
evincing racial discrimination, argued that capital punishment is imposed 
discriminatorily against certain identifiable classes of people. Id. at 364. (Marshall, J., 
concurring, “‘[I]t is usually the poor, the illiterate, the underprivileged, the member 
of the minority group—the man who, because he is without means, and is defended 
by a court-appointed attorney—who becomes society’s sacrificial lamb.’”) (quoting 
politician Michael DiSalle).  Then, in Gregg v. Georgia the death penalty was 
reinstated, and in McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court flatly rejected the constitutional 
challenge to disparate impact in the death penalty’s application. 428 U.S. 153, 206-07 
(1976); 481 U.S. 279 (1987).  In McClesksy the court held that only proof of 
purposeful discrimination against a particular capital defendant would suffice to 
establish racial bias in capital sentencing, effectively barring a petitioner’s ability to 
prove systemic racism in capital punishment. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 292-93. 
 98. See generally Cedric Merlin Powell, Rhetorical Neutrality:  Colorblindness, 
Frederick Douglass, and Inverted Critical Race Theory, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 823 
(2008) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education was the last attempt by the Court 
to eliminate the present effects of past racial oppression). 
 99. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971); see also 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);  Int’l Bhd. of 
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977).  In Griggs, McDonnell Douglas, 
and Teamsters, the Court acknowledged that even absent evidence of actual bad acts 
or words evincing intent to discriminate, discrimination can still occur.  With this 
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The Court became increasingly reluctant to support measures 
designed to encourage employers to comply with Title VII due to an 
unfounded fear that these measures might eventually or effectively 
impose quotas.101  In a 1989 case, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Antonio, the Court fundamentally altered its disparate impact 
analysis, making it harder for plaintiffs to prove their case by 
undermining the presumption of discrimination that previously 
accompanied a showing of impact.102  In Wards Cove, the Court made 
plaintiffs “responsible for isolating and identifying the specific 
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed 
statistical disparities.”103  The dissenters criticized the majority for its 
radical shift in analysis.  Justice Blackmun lamented, “[s]adly, this 
comes as no surprise.  One wonders whether the majority still 
believes that race discrimination—or, more accurately, race 
discrimination against nonwhites—is a problem in our society, 
                                                                                                                 
understanding, the Court showed a willingness to infer discrimination in a variety of 
circumstances, reflecting an appreciation for societal discrimination. 
 100. Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard to Win?, 
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 575 (2001). 
 101. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 993-98 (1988).  Justice 
O’Connor feared that applying disparate impact analysis and broad use of statistics to 
subjective and discretionary employment criteria might lead to the use of quotas.  
Plaintiffs must identify the specific practices alleged to cause the disparity and explain 
the causation.  According to one scholar: 
Justice O’Connor misreads the purpose and the structure of Title VII; she 
assumes that in prohibiting preferential treatment, Congress meant that any 
provision that imposed a duty on employers to take seriously the 
requirement that blacks be hired and promoted, as well as paid equal wages, 
violates that restriction.  It does not.  The plurality opinion, like much of the 
discussion of Title VII by economists, misreads the statute and its purpose. 
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr. Neutrality, The Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights 
Act:  The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 1001 
(1993). 
 102. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).  In Wards Cove, the Court made several significant 
changes to disparate impact jurisprudence.  First, it did not permit the plaintiffs to 
compare the racial composition of two different work areas—salmon cannery 
workers and non-cannery workers—arguing that essentially this would be like 
comparing apples to oranges.  Thus, the plaintiffs could not even raise a prima facie 
case of disparate impact.  Second, the Court required the plaintiffs to identify the 
specific employment practice that had caused the impact.  Third, the Court no longer 
shifted the burden of proof to the employer once the employees raised a prima facie 
case of disparate impact discrimination.  Instead, the Court imposed on the employer 
a lesser burden of production.  Finally, the Court shifted the employer’s defensive 
showing from the Griggs standard—requiring a practice to be job-related and 
consistent with business necessity—to a lighter standard requiring only a “business 
justification.” Id. at 657-59; see Sullivan, supra note 66, at 511-13. 
 103. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 656 (quoting Watson, 487 U.S. at 994). 
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or even remembers that it ever was.”104  The decision sparked 
Congress to pass the 1991 Civil Rights Act to revert back to Griggs-
era burden shifting.105  Yet, while the Act partially restored the 
earlier, plaintiff-friendly analysis, its ambiguous language further 
complicated the state of disparate impact law by granting courts the 
discretion to alter the substance of the procedural burdens.106  Since 
then, courts have continued to demand exacting prima facie cases 
from plaintiffs while maintaining relaxed standards for defendants.107  
The trajectory of Title VII’s larger legal narrative demonstrates how 
the Court has come to view the persistence of race discrimination 
with deep skepticism.108  This position profoundly affects how lower 
courts adjudicate and how the country at large understands the 
problem of racism. 
Still, despite this contemporary judicial disbelief about racial 
disparate impact, the EEOC has continued to articulate the viewpoint 
that criminal history discrimination disproportionately harms people 
of color.  In 2012, the agency issued revised enforcement guidance, 
intended to “consolidate and update” its positions on employers’ 
consideration of applicants’ criminal records.109  The guidance 
dedicates considerable attention to the intersections of race, national 
origin, and criminal records in the context of employment 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id. at 662 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens ended his dissent by 
noting that the reasons for the majority’s shift were “a mystery” to him. Id. at 671-72. 
(Stevens, J., dissenting).  He further explained, “I cannot join this latest sojourn into 
judicial activism.” Id. 
 105. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004); see also Sullivan, supra 
note 66, at 512.  Senator Kennedy introduced an amendment to Title VII “to restore 
and strengthen civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment.” S. 2104, 101st 
Cong. (1990); see also Linda Lye, Title VII’s Tangled Tale:  The Erosion and 
Confusion of Disparate Impact and The Business Necessity Defense, 19 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 315, 334 (1998). 
 106. Nicole J. DeSario, Reconceptualizing Meritocracy:  The Decline of Disparate 
Impact Discrimination Law, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 479, 501 (2003).  The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: 
requires plaintiffs to prove causation and identification in order to establish 
a prima facie case; only if ‘the complaining party can demonstrate to the 
court that the elements of a respondent’s decision-making process are not 
capable of separation for analysis’ can the complainant proceed without 
specifying the employment practice to which the disparate impact may be 
attributed.  Conspicuously absent from the Act is a discussion of the type of 
statistical evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case. 
Id. at 502 (quoting the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2004)). 
 107. See id. at 506-07 (discussing the hurdles plaintiffs face today in using statistics 
to establish a prima facie case). 
 108. Selmi, supra note 100, at 562-63. 
 109. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70. 
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discrimination.110  It states explicitly that employers’ use of criminal 
records to exclude people with criminal histories from employment 
has disproportionately impacted blacks and Latinos because of their 
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system.111  Using 
hypothetical legal scenarios, the guidance outlines the principles 
applicable to relying on criminal records in employment decisions and 
the appropriate disparate treatment analysis for assessing Title VII 
claims.112  The guidance has received considerable attention,113 and 
the agency has in turn taken an aggressive posture in litigation.114  
Overall, however, the guidance has not had a significant impact on 
case outcomes.115  This history shows that while disparate impact 
litigation at one point made it unnecessary to enact laws targeting 
discrimination based on race and criminal records, the contemporary 
legal climate requires an alternative avenue to combat such 
discrimination. 
2. Legally-Mandated Discrimination 
The limits to Title VII protection for people with past criminal 
justice involvement are not purely a matter of judicial interpretation; 
discrimination against ex-offenders is also mandated by thousands of 
                                                                                                                 
 110. Id.; see Michael Pinard, Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. 
J. OF LEG. & PUB. POL’Y, 963, 983 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2383456 [https://perma.cc/3GCV-5TVQ]. 
 111. EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70, at 9-10 
(“African Americans and Hispanics also are incarcerated at rates disproportionate to 
their numbers in the general population . . . . National data . . . supports a finding that 
criminal record exclusions have a disparate impact based on race and national 
origin.”). 
 112. See generally id. 
 113. See Pinard, supra note 110, at 983. 
 114. See Smith, supra note 27, at 224-25.  In particular, two recent cases litigated by 
the EEOC resulted in settlements for the plaintiffs. See Verdict and Settlement 
Summary, EEOC v. BMW Mfg. Co., 2015 WL 5719928 (D.S.C. Sept. 8, 2015); 
Verdict and Settlement Summary, EEOC v. Dolgencorp, 2013 WL 6155464 (S.D. 
Ind. Oct. 3, 2013). 
 115. Despite the successful outcomes mentioned above, other claims by the EEOC 
have hit significant roadblocks.  Compare supra note 114 (listing successful cases), 
with, e.g., EEOC v. Freeman, 961 F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013) (granting summary 
judgment to the defendant and finding that the EEOC, in order to prevail, needed to 
identify a more specific practice than the use of credit history and criminal 
background checks, and prove the disparate impact of that practice); EEOC v. 
Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 748 F.3d 749 (6th Cir. 2014) (affirming, in a credit 
history disparate impact case, summary judgment for the defendant and finding that 
the district court properly excluded the EEOC’s expert testimony regarding the 
impact on the grounds that the expert did not have a reliable method of determining 
individuals’ races). 
1176 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
federal and state laws.116  With the rise of tough-on-crime politics in 
the late 1980s came a torrent of new laws placing restrictions on the 
employment prospects of people with criminal records.117  Today, 
every state has laws that put some degree of criminal record 
restrictions on employment.118  Certain convictions now disqualify a 
person from holding appointed offices and civil service positions;119 
serving in the military; working in some private sector industries, 
agencies, and positions; and obtaining or retaining occupational 
licenses.120  The restricted jobs range from nursing home aid, to real 
estate agent, to pest control technician.121  Former felons are now 
categorically barred from working in more than eight hundred 
occupations because of laws and licensing rules.122 
                                                                                                                 
 116. See Jessica H. Henry & James B. Jacobs, Ban the Box to Promote Ex-
Offender Employment, 6 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y, 755, 755-56 (2007), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/Henry-Jacobs.BantheBox.article.Oct-
07.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2ZK-TYLL]; see also Jordan Segall, Mass Incarceration, 
Ex-Felon Discrimination & Black Labor Market Disadvantage, 14 UNIV. PA. J. LAW 
& SOC. CHANGE 159, 171 (2011). 
 117. See Segall, supra note 116, at 171; see also INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT:  THE 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15 (Marc Mauer & Meda 
Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (summarizing research on consequences of incarceration). 
 118. See Segall, supra note 116, at 171. 
 119. See JACOBS, supra note 6: 
A felony conviction is a permanent bar to public employment in seven 
states.  Many other states also disqualify felons from public employment but 
allow for restoration of eligibility.  Disqualifications can apply to all or some 
felony convictions . . . . Federal hiring policy provides for discretion with 
respect to excluding those with a criminal record from civil service jobs . . . . 
The federal Office of Personnel Management (OPM) imposes ‘suitability 
requirements’ for federal civil service jobs based on subjective criteria . . . . 
In 2013 the House of Representatives approved a bill that prohibits public 
schools from employing teachers and other personnel with certain criminal 
convictions.  
Id. at 261-62. 
 120. See id. at 261. 
 121. See id. at 262-64; see also Darren Wheelock et al., Employment Restrictions 
for Individuals with Felon Status and Racial Inequality in the Labor 
Market, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON RE-ENTRY 278, 284 (Ikponwosa O. Ekunwe & 
Richard S. Jones eds., 2011), http://epublications.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1044&context=socs_fac [https://perma.cc/4MTJ-YRA2] (listing, for example, 
Florida statutes that limit the employment of ex-offenders). 
 122. See Wright, supra note 29.  The American Bar Association identified over 
38,000 statutes that attached collateral consequences to individuals convicted of 
offenses, over eighty percent of which related to employment. See Amy L. Solomon, 
In Search of a Job:  Criminal Records as Barriers to Employment, 270 NAT. INST. 
JUST. J. 42, 44 (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/238488.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3L3X-UM47]; see also National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of 
Conviction, JUST. CTR., http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ [https://perma.cc/
WM74-9MF6]. 
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These laws are premised on the assumption that certain 
occupations in the private and public sectors pose so much risk to the 
public that the government must ensure that they operate safely and 
honestly.123  To be sure, some of these bars to employment, such as 
banning a person convicted of money laundering from working in a 
bank, seem reasonable.  However, many of these rules and 
regulations tend to be highly over-inclusive, often disqualifying ex-
offenders from jobs and occupational licenses unrelated to their 
convictions.124  This is because many of the bans apply to all 
convictions or to all felonies and do not take into consideration the 
time that has passed since the offense.125  For example, Pennsylvania 
bars all ex-offenders form working in health care jobs, which 
ultimately means that a person convicted of shoplifting could not be 
hired to work as a janitor in a hospital.126  Even in states where a ban 
affects only felons who have committed certain crimes, the category 
of disqualifying crimes can be extremely broad.127  Additionally, there 
is a mismatch in the intent and timing for laws that ban felons from 
certain jobs and the types of felonies that actually exist.128  As the list 
of federal felonies continues to increase, older, general laws barring 
all felons—that were created when the term “felony” applied to 
fewer, more serious crimes—are now more punitive than they were 
intended to be.129  Further, laws that place restrictions on the public 
sector pose particular disadvantages for black people who, compared 
to people of other races, tend to be hired in the public sector more 
frequently than in the private sector.130  In this way, lawmakers may 
be viewed as those most responsible for undermining the EEOC’s 
guidance. 
                                                                                                                 
 123. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 264-65. 
 124. See Elena Saxonhouse, Note, Unequal Protection:  Comparing Former 
Felons’ Challenges to Disenfranchisement and Employment Discrimination, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1597, 1617 (2004) (surveying various laws restricting 
the employment of ex-offenders in public and private employment). 
 125. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 269; Saxonhouse, supra note 124, at 1612. 
 126. See Saxonhouse, supra note 124, at 1612. 
 127. “In Delaware, for example, persons convicted of ‘an infamous crime’ are 
barred from public employment, and in Georgia the ban applies to those convicted of 
a felony involving ‘moral turpitude.’” Id. (referencing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4364, 
and GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. III). 
 128. JEFF MANZA & CHRISTOPHER UGGEN, FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 8 (2006). 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Segall, supra note 116, at 174. 
1178 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
3. The Rise of the Criminal Background Check Industry 
Still, many employers who use criminal records to make hiring 
decisions are not required to do so by law.  Computers and the 
information technology revolution have made criminal records more 
publicly accessible than ever before, sparking a new industry that 
controls and exploits the dissemination of conviction and arrest 
information.131  Today, employers’ use of criminal background checks 
is ubiquitous.  In a 2009 survey, ninety-two percent of employers 
reported electively conducting criminal background checks in their 
standard hiring practices.132  These practices inhibit the reentry 
prospects of applicants with criminal histories due to insufficient 
regulation and misguided employer biases.133 
The majority of hiring employers purchase applicants’ criminal 
records cheaply and easily from private companies.134  The larger of 
these companies copy publicly accessible court and other criminal 
records into their own proprietary databases, while the smaller 
                                                                                                                 
 131. For a comprehensive explanation of our nation’s criminal background check 
databases, the policies that regulate them, and the privatized industry that has 
capitalized on and problematized these policies, see generally JACOBS, supra note 6.  
Court records are open to the public and increasingly accessible online.  Some state 
corrections departments (e.g., New Jersey) post online the names, photos, and 
convictions of incarcerated people.  In a few states, even prisoners’ disciplinary 
records are publicly accessible. See id. at 7.  What information gets included in a 
criminal record depends on various, distinct government and state policies. See id.  
“For example, states differ with respect to whether RAP sheets include juvenile 
arrests and adjudications; whether they contain arrests and convictions for minor 
offenses; whether summonses are recorded; whether arrests that do not result in 
convictions are reported to non-criminal justice requesters; and which, if any, arrests 
and convictions can be sealed or expunged.” Id. at 6-7.  Additionally, local police 
departments and prosecutors’ offices have their own policies on what information 
they disseminate in response to requests for criminal record information from people 
and entities who lack statutory designations. See id. at 7. 
 132. See SOC’Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT., BACKGROUND CHECKING:  CONDUCTING 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (Jan. 22, 2010), https://www.slideshare.net/
shrm/background-check-criminal [https://perma.cc/US5Y-8EZT].  The ninety-two 
percent refers to background checks conducted by employers on applicants for some 
or all of the employer’s available positions.  Seventy-three percent required criminal 
background checks for all hires. Id.  These checks occur in varying stages of the hiring 
process.  Nearly seventy-five percent of employment applications inquire at the start 
into an applicant’s criminal background. See Pager, supra note 29, at 955. 
 133. For a counter-argument, see Michael Stoll, Ex-Offenders, Criminal 
Background Checks, and Consequences in the Labor Market, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
381, 383 (2009) (arguing that most of the negative effects of record consideration are 
driven by state statutes (rather than individual employer determinations), regardless 
of whether or not the record is consulted). 
 134. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 70, 150. 
2017] ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN 1179 
operations scour the Internet upon request.135  These companies 
advertise their services as a means for employers to ensure they hire 
reliable employees, while stoking demand by exaggerating the 
potential legal and financial ramifications of hiring people with 
criminal records.136 
There are many policy issues with the booming background check 
industry.  Most troubling is that a staggering proportion of the records 
retrieved in both commercial and government searches are erroneous, 
typically due to failures in recording arrests’ dispositions, frequent 
misattributions of criminal histories, multiple entries of the same 
arrest or conviction, and mistaken names, among other clerical 
errors.137  According to a National Employment Law Project 
(“NELP”) report, out of an estimated 14.4 million FBI background 
checks conducted for employment purposes (including those checks 
that turned up no record), 1.8 million were based on erroneous or 
incomplete information.138  Further, even valid RAP sheets are 
virtually inscrutable to non-justice system personnel, and non-experts 
frequently misinterpret their content.139 
Congress enacted the FCRA of 1970, enforced by the Federal 
Trade Commission (“FTC”), to, in part, protect consumers from the 
abusive practices of companies engaged in selling criminal 
background checks, known as consumer reporting agencies 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Id. at 71. 
 136. Id. at 72, 88. 
 137. Id. at 133-39; see also CRAIG WINSTON, NAT’L ASS’N OF PROF’L BACKGROUND 
SCREENERS, THE NATIONAL CRIME INFORMATION CENTER:  A REVIEW AND 
EVALUATION 6-7 (Aug. 2005), http://www.reentry.net/search/attachment.74268 
[https://perma.cc/U682-66XX] (“[O]f the 174 million arrest cycles on file only 45% 
have dispositions.”).  Because many people who are arrested are never charged or 
convicted, a high percentage of state police and the FBI’s records incorrectly indicate 
a subject’s involvement in crime. 
 138. MADELINE NEIGHLY & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NELP, WANTED:  ACCURATE 
FBI BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 1 (July 2013), http://www.nelp.org/
content/uploads/2015/03/Report-Wanted-Accurate-FBI-Background-Checks-
Employment.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KYN-UGGW].  This data actually reflects that 
fifty percent of records have failures, because the 18.8 million includes felony 
background checks that resulted in a finding of no conviction.  Another study 
conducted by the Bronx Defenders in 2007 found that sixty-two percent of a random 
sample of New York State RAP sheets contained at least one significant error and 
thirty-two percent contained multiple errors.  The number of errors ranged from one 
to nine, with a median of two. See LEGAL ACTION CTR., THE PROBLEM OF RAP 
SHEET ERRORS:  AN ANALYSIS BY THE LEGAL ACTION CENTER 1 (2013), 
https://lac.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/LAC_rap_sheet_report_final_2013.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4PL-N9JD]. 
 139. JACOBS, supra note 6, at 46. 
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(“CRAs”).140  In theory, the FCRA aims to balance the interests of 
employers in making well-informed decisions with protecting 
applicants from the dissemination of inaccurate, misleading, or 
outdated information.141  It imposes obligations on CRAs to “adopt 
reasonable procedures . . . in a manner which is fair and equitable to 
the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, 
and proper utilization of [consumer reports].”142  While the statutory 
language of the FCRA has the potential to afford job applicants the 
opportunity to challenge a misleading or inaccurate report and to 
discuss a criminal history with an employer, the outcomes of these 
cases have been pitiful for plaintiffs.  This is because courts have 
adopted high standards for finding CRAs liable and the FTC has 
provided little guidance on the interpretation of the FCRA’s 
provisions.143 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See Roberto Concepción, Jr., Need Not Apply:  The Racial Disparate Impact 
of Pre-Employment Criminal Background Checks, 19 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & 
POL’Y 231, 234 (2012).  CRAs produce consumer reports, which contain specific 
background information about a person’s criminal background and/or credit. 
The FCRA gives the FTC power to issue ‘procedural’ rules enforcing the 
requirements of the FCRA.  However, the FTC does not have the authority 
to issue rules with the force of law.  As with the EEOC’s guidelines for 
enforcing Title VII, any procedural rules issued by the FTC to administer 
the FCRA will be examined by the court based on their ‘power to 
persuade.’  
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2812-13. 
In 2010, the authority to publish FCRA rules and guidelines was given to the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). Id. at n.93 (citing Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 12 U.S.C. § 5581(5) (2010)).  
About half the states also have their own fair credit reporting laws. SEARCH, NAT’L 
CONSORTIUM FOR JUST. INFO. & STAT., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON 
THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 60 (2005), 
http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZD4S-LHB9]. 
 141. 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2006). 
 142. Id. at § 1681(b).  If a consumer reporting agency does not adhere to the law 
they can be sued for damages.  “Notwithstanding its focus on consumer report 
accuracy, the FCRA prohibits CRAs from reporting arrests more than seven years 
old.  However, as of 1998, the FCRA no longer provides such an exception for 
records of convictions.” JACOBS, supra note 6, at 78 (citing 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(a)(2)(5)).  Thus, an employer may procure a prospective employee’s 
consumer report with a criminal conviction that occurred decades before the date of 
the report. See Concepción, supra note 140, at 234.  Official criminal justice databases 
are not governed by the FCRA because they are not defined as consumer reporting 
agencies. 15 U.S.C. § 1681.  This limitation begs the question:  is it better for the 
government to get its criminal record information from a private data provider who 
can be regulated by the FCRA or from official state criminal justice databases 
without regulation? 
 143. The FCRA offers a private cause of action against CRAs who violate the 
statute, but the plaintiff can only succeed if the CRA is found to have reported 
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Under the mandates of the FCRA, employers interested in 
procuring a consumer report for hiring consideration are required to 
provide notice and obtain written authorization from applicants.144  If 
an employer decides to deny an applicant a position based on the 
findings of the CRA’s report, then the employer must furnish the 
applicant with a copy of the report as well as a description of their 
rights.145  Although an applicant must first consent to the 
procurement of a consumer report, employers are allowed to 
condition employment on such consent.146  Therefore, as one legal 
scholar put it, “the current legal regime . . . has permitted the securing 
of criminal background checks to develop into the widespread 
practice it has become.”147  The FCRA seems to have evolved into 
another enabling mechanism of the proliferating background check 
industry. 
The prevalence of criminal background checks in hiring decisions 
across industries is also a reflection of employer biases that have 
developed as a result of misconceptions about what it means to have a 
criminal record.  One study found that two-thirds of employers 
surveyed in four major U.S. cities would not knowingly hire a person 
with a criminal record, regardless of the offense.148  Proponents of 
these background checks assume that screening applicants for past 
criminal behavior will eliminate problem employees and protect 
against negligent hiring liability,149 regardless of whether the past 
                                                                                                                 
inaccuracies due to “negligent or willful noncompliance.” O’Connell, supra note 69, 
at 2813. 
 144. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(B)(i). 
 145. Id. at § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(ii). 
 146. Concepción, supra note 140, at 235. 
 147. Id. 
 148. HARRY J. HOLZER, WHAT EMPLOYERS WANT:  JOB PROSPECTS FOR LESS-
EDUCATED WORKERS (1996).  The survey was administered to over 3000 employers 
in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Los Angeles. 
 149. From the viewpoint of employers, a criminal record may signal an 
untrustworthy or otherwise problematic employee due to a perceived increased 
propensity to break rules, steal, or harm customers, or because the employer fears 
negligent hiring lawsuits. 
Under the theory of negligent hiring, employers may be liable for the risk 
created by exposing the public and their employees to potentially dangerous 
individuals.  That is, ‘employers who know, or should have known, that an 
employee has had a history of criminal activity may be liable for the 
employee’s criminal or tortious acts.’  Thus, employers may be exposed to 
punitive damages as well as liability for loss, pain, and suffering as a result of 
negligent hiring. 
Stoll, supra note 133, at 388 (citing Shawn D. Bushway, Labor Market Effects of 
Permitting Employer Access to Criminal History Records, 20 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. 
JUST. 276, 277 (2004)). 
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crime is correlated to the job in question.  This position is based on 
the assumption that once a person has committed a crime, they will 
likely commit crimes again in the future, even though numerous 
studies have shown this theory to be flawed.150  In fact, the risk of 
recidivism has been proven to decrease as time since last criminal 
justice contact increases.151  Therefore, the likelihood that an 
applicant with a criminal record will partake in future crime 
compared to another similarly situated applicant without a record is 
extremely dependent on the time that has passed since the offense.152  
Further, stability factors—like employment—play a powerful role in 
reducing that likelihood.  Additionally, according to a 2007 study 
measuring the relationship between criminal history and work 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Redemption in the Presence of 
Widespread Criminal Background Checks, 47 CRIMINOLOGY 327, 331 (2009).  There 
are three leading lines of research explaining the factors that break recidivism.  The 
first argues that “changes in the life course of offenders,” like marriage and 
employment for example, are the primary predictor for risk of future involvement in 
crime. Id. (citing Robert J. Sampson & John H. Laub, Life-Course Desisters?  
Trajectories of Crime Among Delinquent Boys Followed to Age 70, 41 
CRIMINOLOGY 301 (2003); Robert J. Sampson, John H. Laub & Christopher Wimer, 
Does Marriage Reduce Crime?  A Counterfactual Approach to Within-Individual 
Causal Effects, 44 CRIMINOLOGY 465 (2006); Christopher Uggen, Ex-Offenders and 
the Conformist Alternative:  A Job Quality Model of Work and Crime, 46 SOC. 
PROBS. 127 (1999); Joel Wallman & Alfred Blumstein, After the Crime Drop, in THE 
CRIME DROP IN AMERICA (Alfred Blumstein & Joel Wallman eds., 2006); Mark 
Warr, Life-Course Transitions and Desistance From Crime, 36 CRIMINOLOGY 183 
(1998)).  The second line of research shows that there is a “steady decline in criminal 
activity after a peak in the late teens and young-adult period, and [that] aging is one 
of the most powerful explanations of desistance.” Id. (citing David P. Farrington, Age 
and Crime, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:  AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, vol. 7 
(Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1986); Travis Hirschi & Michael R. 
Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552 (1983)).  Finally, 
the third line argues that “time clean since the last offense strongly affects the 
relationship between past and future offending behavior.” Id. (citing MICHAEL 
MALTZ, RECIDIVISM (1984); PETER SCHMIDT & ANN D. WITTE, PREDICTING 
RECIDIVISM USING SURVIVAL MODELS (1988); Christy Visher, Pamela K. Lattimore 
& Richard L. Linster, Predicting the Recidivism of Serious Youthful Offenders Using 
Survival Models, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 329 (1991)).  However, contrary research argues 
that there is a strong correlation between past and future offending. Id. (citing Alfred 
Blumstein, David P. Farrington & Soumyo Moitra, Delinquency Careers:  Innocents, 
Desisters, and Persisters in CRIME AND JUSTICE:  AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, 
vol. 6 (Michael H. Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1985); Robert Brame, Shawn D. 
Bushway & Raymond Paternoster, Examining the Prevalence of Criminal 
Desistance, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 423 (2003); David Farrington, Predicting Individual 
Crime Rates, in CRIME AND JUSTICE:  AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH, vol. 9 
(Don M. Gottfredson & Michael H. Tonry eds., 1987); ALEX PIQUERO, DAVID P. 
FARRINGTON & ALFRED BLUMSTEIN, KEY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL CAREER RESEARCH:  
NEW ANALYSES OF THE CAMBRIDGE STUDY IN DELINQUENT DEVELOPMENT (2007)). 
 151. Id. at 332. 
 152. Id.; see also supra note 150 (citing additional sources). 
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productivity (the only study so far to do so), criminal convictions in 
adolescents do not predict counterproductive work behaviors in early 
adulthood.153  These findings suggest that the hostile contemporary 
climate surrounding the employment of people with records is created 
by socially produced, subjective prejudice, explaining and facilitating 
its correlation with prevalent racial biases.154  Because this prejudice 
has yet to be diminished by mounting evidence that it is unfounded, 
people with records and advocacy groups have been forced to find 
creative solutions to address it. 
4. Enter Ban-the-Box Laws 
The above context, bolstered by judicial conservatism and social 
biases, has necessitated a new legislative protection for people with 
past criminal justice involvement:  the “ban-the-box” law.  More than 
one hundred states, cities, and counties have adopted ban-the-box 
initiatives to ameliorate private and public sector discrimination 
against job applicants with criminal records.155  At a minimum, these 
laws mandate the removal of the “box” on an employment 
application form that must be checked if the applicant has ever been 
convicted of (and sometimes arrested for) a crime.156  The strategy 
behind these laws is, on the one hand, to prevent employers from 
stereotyping applicants with criminal records as less desirable 
employees before individually assessing their skills and, on the other 
hand, to counteract the deterrent effect that the box often has on 
individuals with criminal records.157  These laws do not work to 
entirely preclude employers’ consideration of criminal history but, 
rather, to defer this consideration until later on in the hiring 
process.158  So far, ban-the-box laws have been largely race-neutral, 
                                                                                                                 
 153. See Brent W. Roberts et al., Predicting the Counterproductive Employee in a 
Child-to-Adult Prospective Study, 92 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1427, 1434 (2007). 
 154. A series of studies relying on surveys and in-depth interviews found that firms 
are reluctant to hire young minority men—especially blacks—because they are seen 
as unreliable, dishonest, or lacking in social or cognitive skills. Devah Pager, Bruce 
Western & Bart Bonikowski, Race at Work:  A Field Experiment of Discrimination 
in Low-Wage Labor Markets, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009) (citing, e.g., ROGER 
WALDINGER & MICHAEL I. LICHTER, HOW THE OTHER HALF WORKS:  IMMIGRATION 
AND THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF LABOR (2003)). 
 155. MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & BETH AVERY, NELP, BAN THE BOX 
FAIR CHANCE STATE AND LOCAL GUIDE (2017), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/35XX-WZUC] [hereinafter NELP GUIDE]. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 116, at 757. 
 158. See id. 
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focusing on the status of the applicant as a person with a previous 
criminal record and not on the particular direct and collateral 
consequences that criminal records have on people of color. 
A San Francisco-based ex-offender group, All of Us or None 
(“AUN”), led the ban-the-box movement in 2004, persuading the San 
Francisco Board of Supervisors to pass a resolution calling on the city 
and county to eliminate the criminal record question from public job 
application forms, except in instances where state or local law 
expressly barred certain ex-offenders from a particular job.159  Under 
this resolution, an employer can consider an applicant’s criminal 
background only once they have been selected as a finalist for the 
position.160  At that point, a criminal record would only be relevant if 
it created an unacceptable risk that the applicant could not fulfill the 
job’s requirements.161  Since AUN’s initial efforts, the movement has 
consistently gained momentum, demonstrating enormous organizing 
power with support from communities of color.162  At least twenty-
one state governments have adopted ban-the-box policies.163  Seven 
states—Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
Oregon, and Rhode Island—have even removed the conviction 
history question on job applications for private employers.164 
While all ban-the-box laws delay the moment in the hiring process 
when an employer can ask an applicant about his or her criminal 
history, the laws vary substantially by jurisdiction.165  First, the laws 
differ in form, ranging from executive orders, to resolutions, to civil 
                                                                                                                 
 159. See JACOBS, supra note 6, at 271 (citing S.F., Cal., Resolution No. 764-05 (Oct. 
11, 2005), http://www.sfbos.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/bdsupvrs/resolutions05/r0764-05.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/MG6F-68JC]). 
 160. See id. 
 161. See Henry & Jacobs, supra note 116, at 757. 
 162. See, e.g., Executives’ Alliance, Executives’ Alliance Foundation Leaders “Ban 
the Box, Issue Call to Action for All U.S. Philanthropic Institutions to Adopt Fair 
Chance Hiring Measures, PR NEWSWIRE (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/executives-alliance-foundation-leaders-ban-the-box-issue-
call-to-action-for-all-us-philanthropic-institutions-to-adopt-fair-chance-hiring-
measures-300227780.html [https://perma.cc/AG9V-ZN76] (showing how AUN and 
the California’s Alliance for Boys and Men of Color worked together to advance 
ban-the-box legislation).  Successful advocacy like this is due in large measure to 
mobilization efforts by individuals with criminal records, organizations formed by 
and working with those individuals, as well as networks of policy and legal 
organizations. 
 163. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Adriel Garcia, Note, The Kobayashi Maru of Ex-Offender Employment:  
Rewriting the Rules and Thinking Outside Current “Ban the Box” Legislation, 85 
TEMP. L. REV. 921, 927-29 (2013). 
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rights statutes.  In terms of their content, there are six areas of the 
laws, in particular, where differences arise:166  (1) whether the law 
covers public or private employers, or both;167 (2) the stage in the 
hiring process at which criminal history information can be 
considered;168 (3) the types of criminal history information that can be 
considered;169 (4) the factors an employer must use to evaluate the 
criminal history information;170 (5) the disclosure obligations for an 
                                                                                                                 
 166. For a detailed layout of these six variations among ban-the-box laws, see 
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2818-28. 
 167. The majority of ban-the-box laws apply to public employers only.  These laws 
typically cover state, city, and district jobs, but the scope of what constitutes a public 
employer is also defined by these statutes.  For example, Connecticut’s public-
employer statute only applies to jobs at the state level. Id. at 2821 (citing CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 46a-80(a):  “a person shall not be disqualified from employment by the state 
[of Connecticut] or any of its agencies . . . .”).  Still, while most ban-the-box laws 
apply to public employers only, there are a number of jurisdictions that regulate the 
hiring policies of private companies as well, and some that regulate both. See, e.g., 
NELP GUIDE, supra note 155.  The Hawaii statute, for example, affects public and 
private employers. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(a) (West 2013). 
 168. The time at which an employer can—under a ban-the-box law—conduct a 
criminal background check on an applicant (if at all) spans a significant range. See 
O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2822.  Some statutes designate this point at the time an 
applicant is offered an interview. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 364.021(a) (West 2013) 
(stating that a public employer in Minnesota may not inquire into the criminal 
background of an applicant until the applicant has been selected for an interview).  
Others designate the point at the time an applicant is determined to be qualified for 
the position. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(b) (West 2013) (stating that 
employers in Connecticut cannot even inquire about a prospective employee’s past 
convictions until such prospective employee has been deemed otherwise qualified for 
the position).  Still others require the employer to wait until a conditional offer is 
made. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.5(b) (West 2013) (stating that Hawaiian 
employers may only consider an applicant’s criminal background after extending a 
conditional offer of employment to the applicant).  This variation in timeframe is due 
to legislators’ desire to balance “both the applicant’s interest in demonstrating his or 
her qualifications to an employer with the employer’s interest in using its time 
productively.” O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2821-22. 
 169. Several ban-the-box statutes limit the consideration employers can give to an 
applicant’s record to specific offenses and time periods, while others make no such 
limitations. See O’Connell, supra note 69, at 2822.  For example, a law might limit 
an employer’s ability to consider a prospective employee’s arrest or misdemeanor 
record. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-80(e); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-
2.5(c) (limiting Hawaiian employers from considering convictions more than ten 
years old from the period of incarceration).  Other statutes, however, like that in 
Minnesota, impose no limitation on what employers can consider. See MINN STAT. 
ANN. § 364.021(a) (making no explicit limitation on the information available to 
employers in Minnesota). 
 170. Many of the laws present criteria for how an employer should weigh an 
applicant’s specific criminal history.  “Typical factors include:  the seriousness of the 
conviction, the crime’s relationship to the job, the time elapsed since arrest or 
conviction, and the applicant’s rehabilitation efforts.” O’Connell, supra note 69, at 
2824. 
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employer after conducting a background check;171 and (6) the entity 
responsible for enforcing the laws.172  These differences make it 
difficult to analyze the impact of ban-the-box legislation as a whole 
because there are a variety of factors to independently isolate and 
measure.173 
Despite these difficulties, ban-the-box legislation has been widely 
celebrated for improving the employment outcomes of people with 
criminal records.174  But when the data about those employment 
outcomes is scrutinized, crucial information is missing:  there has been 
no measurement of the laws’ impact on the specific population of 
people of color with records.  The main reason for this failure is likely 
a contemporary political resistance to citing racial disparities as a 
                                                                                                                 
 171. Some statutes require an employer to disclose to an applicant once it has 
conducted a criminal background check.  Laws with this provision further mandate 
that the employer disclose to the applicant what the check revealed and, if the 
criminal history precludes the applicant from the position, explain the reasons why.  
This variation in the laws also generally provides an opportunity for the applicant to 
challenge any inaccuracies in the background check. 
 172. The agencies and state departments that have been designated as enforcers of 
ban-the-box laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  For example, Delaware and 
Illinois both place their Departments of Labor in charge of regulating unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of a background check, while San Francisco has tasked its 
Office of Labor Standards Enforcement with enforcing the city’s Fair Chance 
Ordinance (creating preemption concerns, because San Francisco’s fair chance 
initiative is much stricter than California’s ban-the-box law).  But many state ban-the-
box statutes do not name an enforcement agency or lay out what remedies are 
available to plaintiffs.  California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maryland, 
Nebraska, and New Mexico do not expressly charge any state government agency 
with enforcement responsibilities.  Massachusetts and Rhode Island handle 
enforcement through special commissions created and tasked to investigate ban-the-
box violations.  Minnesota places public employers in charge of their own compliance 
with the ban-the-box legislation and instructs government agencies to follow the 
adjudication procedures set forth in the state’s Administrative Procedure Act.  For 
private employers, the state’s Commissioner of Human Rights conducts 
investigations of alleged violations and imposes monetary penalties. See O’Connell, 
supra note 69, at 2826-28.  The laws also show a wide variance in penalties on 
noncomplying employers:  Massachusetts’ criminal review board has the power to 
impose fines up to $5000 for each violation.  In contrast, Rhode Island allows for 
monetary fines, backpay, and other compensatory awards upon a finding of 
intentional discrimination. See id. at 2828. 
 173. Even the forms of these laws vary.  For example, executive orders and 
administrative policies are not voted on by representatives because the sole decision 
is made by the executive branch—therefore they are less susceptible to public 
scrutiny and do not have the same level of public transparency.  Municipal ordinances 
(a more permanent policy solution) are passed through a public process where 
members of the city or county government vote on the record, which gives the 
community the ability to hold elected representatives accountable for their voting 
record. 
 174. See infra Part III. 
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justification for increasing protections for people with criminal 
records in hiring practices.175 
While nearly half of the ban-the-box laws implemented so far 
comply with the 2012 EEOC guidance,176 which is informed by 
disparate impact theory,177 their formal legislative intents are, for the 
most part, silent as to any anti-racial discrimination motivations.178  
San Francisco’s 2014 Fair Chance Ordinance is a good example of the 
dissonance between the advocacy that originally drove the 
implementation of these laws and the legal orientations of their final 
products in regards to considerations of race.179  The AUN campaign, 
which spearheaded both the city’s original 2004 resolution for public 
employers and the newer ordinance—applying to private employers 
as well—has always remained vocal about the connections between 
criminal record employment discrimination and race.180  Yet, the 
                                                                                                                 
 175. “Advocates and sponsors of these laws have argued, primarily, that the 
practices these laws target amount to pervasive, and growing, barriers to 
employment—barriers that make it very difficult for large numbers of people, of all 
races, to find a job.” Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1442 (2014). 
 176. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155. 
 177. See EEOC ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE NO. 915.002, supra note 70. 
 178. Indeed, in some legislative debates, the issue of racial disparate impact does 
not appear to have been discussed at all. See, e.g., Hearing on S.B. 4 Before the S. 
Fin. Comm., 2013 Leg., 433rd Sess. (Md. 2013).  At the Finance Committee hearing 
about Maryland’s ban-the-box bill, speakers made a variety of arguments but race 
and disparate impact were not mentioned. Id.; see also Fishkin, supra note 175, at 
1442 (“[I]n state legislatures . . . the racial disparate impact story, while present to 
some degree, has not been the primary justification legislators have offered for 
enacting these laws”).  For examples of laws that do expressly mention discriminatory 
impact in their purpose and/or legislative histories, see PHILA. CITY COUNCIL, § 9-
3501-1(e) (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.phila.gov/HumanRelations/PDF/BanTheBox
Ordinance.pdf [https://perma.cc/YPC8-S8CX]; N.Y. COMM. ON CIV. RTS., REPORT OF 
THE GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS DIVISION 4 (June 9, 2015), http://legistar.council.nyc.
gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1739365&GUID=EF70B69C-074A-4B8E-9D36-
187C76BB1098 [https://perma.cc/U8CW-XFVM].  These examples of legislation that 
effectively incorporate the importance of combating disparate impact on racial 
minorities reveal the extent of the limitations of other comparable laws that do not 
incorporate this intent in their express purposes. 
 179. Bd. of Supervisors, File No. 131192, NELP (Jan. 27, 2014), 
http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/03/San_Francisco_Fair_Chance_Ordinance
_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQ6M-AYD7]. 
 180. See Ban the Box, LEGAL SERV. FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILD.: ALL OF US OR 
NONE, http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-none/ban-the-
box-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/AA47-L75E]; see also Dorsey Nunn, Ban the Box 
Keeps Families and Communities Together, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2016 3:21 AM), 
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/04/13/should-a-jail-record-be-an-
employers-first-impression/ban-the-box-keeps-families-and-communities-together 
[https://perma.cc/Q38N-VNBL] (“The American criminal justice system has been and 
continues to be fraught by racism.  People of color in general and black people in 
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“Findings” section of the new law, which lists its purposes and intent, 
performs rhetorical gymnastics to avoid mentioning race at all: 
A major rationale for this movement is the growing awareness that 
incarceration has devastating socioeconomic consequences.  
Researchers have found that more incarceration has the perverse 
effect of increasing the crime rate in some communities.  Children 
suffer academically and socially, and have decreased economic 
mobility, after the incarceration of a parent.  Incarceration is also 
linked to homelessness, impacting public health and safety.  Twenty-
six percent of homeless people surveyed in San Francisco had been 
incarcerated within the previous twelve months and an estimated 
thirty to fifty percent of parolees in San Francisco are homeless.181 
The language of the Act goes on to identify “criminal justice costs” 
as the primary incentive for implementing the legislation, so that 
taxpayers will save money.182 
San Francisco’s story of de-racialized legislative intent is not 
unique.  In New Jersey the advocacy group New Jersey Institute for 
Social Justice (“NJISJ”)—which aims to “ensure the civil rights and 
other equal opportunities of minorities and low-income 
individuals”183—spearheaded the state’s ban-the-box movement by 
engaging the local private employer community through “business 
roundtables.”184  NJISJ’s advocacy kept racial impact at the center of 
the discussions about the law.  In a 2013 press release signaling the 
upcoming ban-the-box legislation, NJISJ stated, “[a] majority of the 
nation’s 65 million people with criminal records are people of color, 
and these communities are among those most impacted by these 
practices.”185  Yet, while the coalition-building efforts of the NJISJ 
were motivated by antidiscrimination language, the intent of the law 
was memorialized in race-neutral terms.  The statute begins with a 
section entitled: “findings and declarations regarding employment of 
                                                                                                                 
particular are being stopped, detained, questioned, arrested, convicted, and 
sentenced more often than whites.  Black men are six times as likely as white men to 
be incarcerated during their lifetime.  This means that we are unable to fairly 
compete for employment because of a conviction history or the assumption of having 
one, based on race.”). 
 181. NELP, supra note 179, at 3. 
 182. Id. 
 183. About NJISJ, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST., http://www.njisj.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/R6PB-ZZYE]. 
 184. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 18. 
 185. NJISJ Press Release:  New Legislation Opens Opportunity to Compete for 
Employment, N.J. INST. FOR SOC. JUST. (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.njisj.org/njisj_
press_release_new_legislation_opens_opportunity_to_compete_for_employment 
[https://perma.cc/4687-33AE]. 
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persons with criminal records,” and, like the San Francisco ordinance, 
the statute does not mention combating disparate impact on racial 
minorities.  Instead, the law openly states, “[i]t is the intent and 
purpose of ‘The Opportunity to Compete Act’ to improve the 
economic viability, health, and security of New Jersey 
communities.”186  One wonders why race is erased from the language 
of these laws, enacted after being led by very race-conscious 
movements.187 
The jettisoning of race from the language of the ban-the-box laws 
has led to the complete failure to measure the impact of the laws on 
minority groups.188  In order to take stock of what these laws can truly 
accomplish, it is necessary both to enforce data collection, where it 
has already been implemented, that specifically measures the 
employment of black and Latino people with past criminal justice 
involvement and to build this data mandate into legislation going 
forward.  In the wake of the Obama Administration’s consideration 
of a federal ban-the-box law,189 a moment of self-awareness is called 
for to recognize the history behind these laws and to consider to 
whom they should apply. 
                                                                                                                 
 186. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:6B-12 (2014). 
 187. Potentially, a reason for this erasure is the fact that race is a suspect 
classification and would be subject to strict scrutiny and more likely to be invalidated, 
even if the statute purports to be racially beneficial; the legislative gymnastics may 
ensure that the statute, if challenged, would presumably only be subject to rational 
basis review. 
 188. See infra Part III. 
 189. See Dave Boyer, Obama Finalizes Regulation to ‘Ban the Box’ on Hiring Job 
Applicants With Criminal Records, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 30, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/nov/30/obama-finalizes-regulation-ban-
box-job-applicants/ [https://perma.cc/Y9NQ-2KBX]; Fact Sheet:  White House 
Launches the Fair Chance Business Pledge, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 11, 2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/04/11/fact-sheet-white-house-
launches-fair-chance-business-pledge [https://perma.cc/7CFQ-7L2V].  Following on 
the heels of President Obama’s endorsement of the ban-the-box movement in 2015, 
Attorney General Loretta Lynch hosted officials of nineteen companies to create a 
founding business pledge to implement federal fair chance hiring policies.  NELP 
believes that a federal ban-the-box law is on the horizon. On the President’s 
Announcement on ‘Ban the Box’ Hiring, NELP (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nelp.org/news-releases/on-the-presidents-announcement-on-ban-the-box-
hiring/ [https://perma.cc/ZS8U-5MNL]. See also Reuters, Obama Calls to “Ban the 
Box,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/video/multimedia/
100000004014582/obama-calls-to-ban-the-box.html [https://perma.cc/9Y86-D2X4]. 
1190 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
B. Reconsidering and Repositioning Ban-the-Box in Light of 
Sociological Studies and Their Political-Historical Context 
The absence of race conscious language from the ban-the-box 
legislation is problematic because it obfuscates not only the source of 
the momentum behind these laws but also the possibility that 
employers will manipulate them by making assumptions about 
criminal history based on racial prejudice.  This Note identifies these 
issues to strengthen the legislation going forward and to advocate for 
reinforcing the visibility of race in efforts to ameliorate the collateral 
consequences of having a criminal record. 
1. Sociological Study on Race, Criminality, and Employment 
First, it is important to acknowledge that, even though racial 
impact was the original driving force behind ban-the-box legislation 
(and remains so among many advocacy groups),190 empirical research 
on the hiring practices around criminal records has not shown that 
removing the box will necessarily improve employment outcomes for 
people of color with records.  Devah Pager’s 2003 study remains so 
crucial because it demonstrates that, among the Milwaukee 
employers observed, overt racial discrimination and its links to 
perceived criminality were even more prevalent than discrimination 
based on the records themselves.191  Therefore, even in the absence of 
criminal background checks, employers often use race or racial 
indicators (such as education levels) to make assumptions about 
criminality and unsuitability for jobs.192 
In fact, some sociologists argue that removing the box could have 
an adverse impact on the employment of people of color with records 
                                                                                                                 
 190. See, e.g., Cornell William Brooks, Ban the Box, BRENNAN CTR. (Apr. 27, 
2015), https://www.brennancenter.org/analysis/ban-box [https://perma.cc/4E7M-
7QRB] (showing that increased employment outcomes for people of color with 
records specifically remains a central policy concern for the NAACP). 
 191. See PAGER, supra note 8. 
 192. Id. at 93.  There are two central findings of Pager’s study in respect to the 
specific hardship of ex-offender status for people of color.  First, the criminal record 
stigma effect is larger for blacks (given the sixty-five percent reduction in the callback 
rates for black ex-offenders, relative to the fifty percent reduction for whites).  
Second, animus-based racial discrimination against blacks is more important than 
record-based discrimination in explaining the inferior employment outcomes of black 
men (given the finding that black non-offenders receive fewer callbacks than white 
ex-offenders).  Interestingly, although race emerged as a key theme in Pager’s 
findings, the topic of racial discrimination was not the central focus of the original 
research.  In fact, the research design yielded only indirect evidence of racial 
discrimination because black and white testers did not apply to the same employers. 
See PAGER, supra note 8. 
2017] ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN 1191 
because of the insidious racial biases surrounding criminality in 
America.  Public policy professors Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, 
and Michael Stoll conducted multi-city, survey-based research in 2006 
that revealed that employers are actually more likely to hire black 
Americans if they check criminal records, particularly employers who 
report being generally averse to hiring ex-offenders.193  In other 
words, confirming Pager’s findings, when criminal records were not 
consulted, black people were assumed to have them.  Holzer, 
Raphael, and Stoll identify this phenomenon as “statistical 
discrimination,” meaning that employers who look unfavorably on 
applicants with criminal histories systematically overestimate the 
correlation between race and criminality.194  Their analysis even 
suggests that this statistical discrimination is significant enough to 
undermine any negative effects of criminal background checks on 
black hiring rates by detrimentally affecting the job prospects of 
individuals with clean histories who belong to demographic groups 
that have high conviction rates.195  Michael Stoll updated the study in 
2009, relying on new data, and confirmed the results of the earlier 
research.196 
Also in 2009, Bruce Western, Bart Bonikowski, and Devah Pager 
published an extension of Pager’s 2003 study, investigating statistical 
discrimination more closely.197  They had created matched teams of 
white, black, and Latino testers who had applied to 340 real, entry-
level jobs in New York City in 2004.198  Their work confirmed the 
                                                                                                                 
 193. Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Perceived Criminality, 
Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J. L. 
& ECON. 451 (2006). 
 194. Id. at 452 (borrowing from economic theory). 
 195. See id.; see also Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Will 
Employers Hire Former Offenders?  Employer Preferences, Background Checks, 
and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING AMERICA:  THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS 
INCARCERATION 205, 236 (Mary Pattillo, David Weiman & Bruce Western eds., 
2004). 
 196. See generally Stoll, supra note 133.  Stoll’s work also showed that legally-
mandated discrimination was the main source of the negative impact of background 
checks on employers’ hiring decisions, and that for those employers who were not 
required to check criminal history, the check itself was neither the rate-determining-
factor nor the source of discrimination. Id. at 407. 
 197. Devah Pager, Bruce Western & Bart Bonikowski, Discrimination in a Low-
Wage Labor Market:  A Field Experiment 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2009), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2915472/#APP1 
[https://perma.cc/T5MJ-ST69]. 
 198. Id.  The testers were selected for specific qualities:  they were well-spoken, 
clean-cut young men, ages twenty-two to twenty-six.  Most of them were college-
educated, between five feet ten inches and six feet in height, and recruited in and 
around New York City. 
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earlier determination of intense contemporary racial attitudes.  The 
new study found that employer prejudice fell into three categories of 
behavior:  (1) “categorical exclusion,” characterized by an immediate 
rejection of the black candidate in favor of a white applicant; (2) 
“shifting standards,” reflecting actively shaped decisions made 
through a racial lens that considers black applicants more critically 
than whites;199 and (3) “race-based job channeling,” resulting in 
steering black applicants toward particular job types usually with 
greater physical demands and reduced customer contact.200  Together, 
these categories “illustrate how racial disadvantage is dynamically 
constructed and reinforced, with the assessment of applicant 
qualifications and suitability subject to interpretation and bias.”201  
The arbitrary nature of statistical discrimination likely makes it 
difficult to approach legislatively.  Indeed, Western has questioned 
whether limiting criminal background information will have the 
desired effect for minority ex-offenders.202 
However, Pager, Western, and Bonikowski’s report indicated an 
intervention point for ban-the-box laws and their potential to have a 
real impact on increasing employment outcomes of people of color 
with records.203  Black applicants who met face-to-face with hiring 
authorities were found to fare better than those who did not,204 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id.  The researchers provided an example of shifting standards prejudice they 
observed in the field:   
In one case, Joe, a black tester, was not allowed to apply for a sales position 
due to his lack of direct experience.  He reported, ‘[the employer] handed 
me back my résumé and told me they didn’t have any positions to offer 
me . . . that I needed a couple years of experience.’  The employer voiced 
similar concerns with Josue and Kevin, Joe’s Latino and white partners.  
Josue wrote, ‘After a few minutes of waiting . . . I met with [the employer] 
who looked over my résumé.  He said that he was a little worried that I 
would not be able to do the work.’  Kevin reported an even stronger 
reaction:  ‘[The employer] looked at my résumé and said, ‘There is 
absolutely nothing here that qualifies you for this position.’  Yet, despite 
their evident lack of qualifications, Kevin and Josue were offered the sales 
job and asked to come back the next morning.  In interactions with all three 
testers, the employer clearly expressed his concern over the applicants’ lack 
of relevant work experience.  This lack of experience was not grounds for 
disqualification for the white and Latino candidates, whereas the black 
applicant was readily dismissed. 
Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Bruce Western, Criminal Background Checks and Employment Among 
Workers with Criminal Records, 7 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 413, 413 (2008). 
 203. Pager, Western & Bonikowski, supra note 197. 
 204. Id. 
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suggesting that in-person contact has the power to replace broad 
generalizations based on group membership with more nuanced 
information about an applicant’s individual qualities.205  Christopher 
Uggen and others’ later study on applicants with past low-level 
convictions came to the same conclusion.206  Referring to the efficacy 
of in-person contact for applicants with records generally, he noted, 
“[j]obseekers who make direct contact are thus much more likely to 
be called back by employers who may wish to provide a ‘second 
chance’ to an otherwise promising applicant.”207  But in instances 
where employers use categorical exclusion and shifting standards to 
make decisions about applicants of color, even in-person interviews 
are unlikely to have a significant affect.  Further, black applicants 
generally have far less access to face-time with hiring authorities than 
whites.208 
The sociological research conducted on this issue up until now is 
far from complete or definitive in regards to its reflection on ban-the-
box legislation specifically.  But the empirical data gathered so far 
makes clear the necessity to allocate attention and resources to 
monitor how ban-the-box laws will impact people of color with 
records in particular.  The research shows that race remains highly 
salient in employers’ evaluations of workers, consistently expressed 
through a conflation of race and criminality in hiring decisions.209  
Therefore, failing to remain race-conscious in this new legal arena 
could come at the expense of those who fought to have these laws 
enacted to protect them. 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See id. at App. Table A1; see infra App. A.  Still, this research was not 
definitive and, further, the recorded advantage of personal contact for blacks was not 
as significant as that of whites. 
 206. Christopher Uggen et al., The Edge of Stigma:  An Experimental Audit of the 
Effects of Low-Level Criminal Records on Employment, 52 CRIMINOLOGY 627, 643 
(2014) (“personal contact is an especially powerful [hiring] predictor for African 
American applicants”). 
 207. Id. at 631 (citing Pager, Western & Bonikowski, supra note 197). 
 208. Id.  Because black applicants receive call backs thirty percent less frequently 
than whites, they more rarely make it to the stages in hiring when they can speak to 
an employer face to face. Id. at 631. 
 209. This theory is challenged by a study of the Hawaii ban-the-box law in 2014.  
Although the study was not specifically measuring the effect of the ban-the-box law 
on the employment prospects of black job applicants, the results showed that “repeat 
offending dropped precipitously among both blacks and non-blacks following the 
implementation of Hawaii’s ban the box law,” and concluded that “the negative 
impact of the law on the employment prospects of black job applicants would 
probably be minimal at best.” Stewart J. D’Alessio, Lisa Stolzenberg & Jamie L. 
Flexon, The Effect of Hawaii’s Ban the Box Law on Repeat Offending, 40 AM. J. 
CRIM. JUST. 336, 349 (2014). 
1194 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIV 
Another sociological framework that can be used to consider how 
ban-the-box laws will impact racial minorities is an established theory 
behind organizations’ responses to employment discrimination 
legislation.  According to a seminal article in this field by Lauren 
Edelman, because equal employment opportunity laws tend to set 
forth broad and ambiguous principles, organizations (or employers) 
receive and manipulate wide latitude to construct the meaning of 
compliance in ways that meet legal demands but preserve managerial 
interests.210  In particular, Edelman identifies ambiguity in respect to 
compliance with equal employment opportunity laws as a source of 
their vulnerability to manipulation.211  In response to pressure to 
ameliorate discrimination, organizations take advantage of these 
areas of vulnerability by creating formal structures that act as visible 
symbols of their attention to the law, while preserving their 
managerial discretion.212  In light of this tendency, ban-the-box laws 
are particularly at risk of manipulation, especially because of their 
varied and broad language.213  Thus, identifying the racial 
considerations motivating enforcement will aid in ensuring that 
organizations do not engage in purely cosmetic structural 
reorientation in order to appear to be less discriminatory, while still 
making criminal history prejudice-based decisions. 
Using Edelman’s institutional theory, Christopher Uggen, Sarah E. 
Lageson, and Mike Vuolo conducted a recent study using field data to 
examine how employers navigate legal ambiguity and construct 
compliance in making decisions about applicants with low-level 
criminal histories in the rapidly changing legal environment.214  They 
found that applicants with low-level criminal histories were more 
                                                                                                                 
 210. Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Ambiguity and Symbolic Structures:  
Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1531, 1531-32 (1992).  
Using previous sociological research, Edelman argues that those responsible for 
formulating, interpreting, and enforcing social reform laws are part of the dominant 
class, and use their authority to construct law in a way that preserves the status quo 
while giving the appearance of change.  Pointing to failures in equal employment 
opportunity law specifically, she argues that organizations, rather than resist law 
overtly, are motivated by weaknesses and the mechanics of the legal process to 
construct law in a manner that is minimally disruptive to the status quo and to create 
institutional forms of compliance that maximize their own interests. 
 211. Id. at 1536.  Edelman also identifies courts’ standard interpretation that the 
laws constrain organizational procedures more than the outcomes of those 
procedures and weak enforcement measures as the two other main areas of 
vulnerability in equal employment opportunity laws. Id. at 1538-41. 
 212. Id. at 1542. 
 213. See supra Section II.A.4. 
 214. Sarah Esther Lageson, Mike Vuolo & Christopher Uggen, Legal Ambiguity in 
Managerial Assessments of Criminal Records, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 175 (2015). 
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likely to find employment in a workplace that has formally assessed 
the risks and legalities associated with hiring an applicant with a 
record, as opposed to a firm where hiring managers make largely 
subjective hiring decisions and personally carry the burden of 
liability.215  Therefore, when allowed high levels of discretion, most 
employers used that discretionary power to protect themselves in 
their hiring decisions.216  In their assessment, Uggen, Lageson, and 
Vuolo evaluated the formal requirements and limitations of the 2012 
EEOC enforcement guidance,217 but their determination is also 
applicable to ban-the-box legislation—in order to increase 
enforcement, specificity in procedural compliance is essential. 
Outcome-based sociological studies show that, although the ban-
the-box movement and legislation is the next step in protecting 
persons with criminal records, and particularly persons of color with 
criminal records, the history and context of how the laws were made 
may make them insufficient to solve the problem of race and criminal 
record-based discrimination or may actually exacerbate such 
discrimination.  The studies suggest that the laws can be improved by 
specifying race conscious compliance measures that do not 
categorically exclude criminal background checks, but that mandate 
the employer to use them specifically to dissipate hardened race-
based perceptions of color and criminality. 
2. Using Critical Race Theory and Critical Legal Theory to 
Consider Ban-the-Box Law 
The studies conducted by Pager, Western, Uggen, and others can 
be situated within a tradition of civil rights law criticism that is 
particularly pertinent to the issue in question.  Failures in civil rights 
law, crystallized in the troubling legacy of Brown v. Board of 
Education,218 have led legal scholars to reconsider the efficacy of 
certain forms of the liberal legal model,219 particularly in response to 
a conservative judicial trend to look more and more skeptically on 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Id. at 196. 
 216. Id.  Notably, this seems to contradict the findings of Stoll. See Stoll, supra note 
133. 
 217. Lageson, Vuolo & Uggen, supra note 214, at 197. 
 218. The public school system is more segregated today than it was at the time of 
the decision. See Emily Richmond, Schools are More Segregated Today Than During 
the Late 1960s, ATLANTIC (June 11, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/
archive/2012/06/schools-are-more-segregated-today-than-during-the-late-
1960s/258348/ [https://perma.cc/NW8L-RB6W]. 
 219. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters:  Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976). 
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disparate impact’s founding principles.220  Contemporary work in this 
canon recognizes that future legislation must respond to the political 
context and the demonstrated social resistance to legal remedies for 
discrimination.221  Progressive critics of civil rights legislation have 
advocated for creative models that address structural racism by 
challenging the conventional ways that laws create and solidify 
patterns of meaning.222  These models reject an understanding of civil 
rights law as solely a removal of state-sanctioned barriers to an 
individual’s mobility—which leaves any remaining inequality a result 
of the individual’s personal failure—and, instead, advocate for the 
dismantling of the structures that create those barriers to begin 
with.223 
Against this backdrop, the ban-the-box movement marks a break 
from traditional civil rights law because it operates on the assumption 
that the criminal justice system manufacturers disadvantage.  In this 
way, protecting the category of people with records, rather than 
minorities with records exclusively, aligns with the powerful transition 
in critical legal theory that destabilizes the fixed idea of race as a 
biological category and instead links race to ideas about the way 
power structures define relationships and allocate resources.224  
However, the critical race model does not preclude race visibility.225  
Indeed, acknowledging that the population of people with records 
does not comprise a category determined by skin color is not the 
same thing as ignoring criminal records’ unequal impact on racial 
minorities. 
There are liberals who believe that the advancement of minority 
groups comes only through social programs with “universal appeal” 
                                                                                                                 
 220. In Ricci v. DeStefano, Justice Scalia argued that disparate impact law is in 
deep tension with the Equal Protection Clause.  In a concurrence that attracted wide 
attention, he asserted that because “Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a 
racial thumb on the scales [raising equal protection concerns] . . . . the war between 
disparate impact and equal protection will be waged sooner or later.” 557 U.S. 557, 
594-97 (2009).  For further discussion on this trend, see William Gordon, The 
Evolution of the Disparate Impact Theory of Title VII:  A Hypothetical Case Study, 
44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 529, 531 (2007); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact 
Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734 (2006); Michael J. Songer, Note, 
Decline of Title VII Disparate Impact:  The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights Act and the 
Ideologies of Federal Judges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 257-59 (2005). 
 221. See, e.g., LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY (2002). 
 222. Id. at 35. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. at 35, 74 (citing Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is 
Colorblind,” in CRITICAL RACE THEORY 260 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., eds., 1995)). 
 225. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 221, at 14-32. 
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that minimize or eliminate overt discussion of race.  These civil rights 
theorists argue that, so long as social programs and laws present as 
government aid to blacks and other communities of color, popular 
support for them will decline.226  Additionally, they claim that making 
race a central issue compounds stereotypes and makes populations 
particularly vulnerable to negative attention.227  Thus, according to 
this vision of liberal integration, racial silence in political and legal 
discourse is deemed necessary.228  This viewpoint adheres partially to 
the rejection of biological essentialism by allowing individuals who 
share political sympathies with the struggles of racialized groups 
(regardless of whether they fall into the same diagnostic category) to 
organize with minorities in support of reform.229  But removing race 
from legislative language couples with the American social 
governance practice of systematically hiding the minority experience 
from view, exemplified by the Census’ flagrant tradition of 
underreporting employment and poverty data for people of color by 
erasing incarcerated populations from the data pool.230  Further, it 
deprives communities of color of crucial ammunition for ensuring that 
these laws do, in fact, help them. 
Perhaps the most troubling aspect of the race neutrality of the ban-
the-box laws is that it reflects an amnesia on the part of legislators 
about the origins of the remedy—as a reaction to failures in the 
implementation of Title VII.  Since its passage, the Supreme Court 
has undermined the color-conscious premise of Title VII’s 
antidiscrimination principle231 by systematically rejecting the 
existence of structural racism.232  Formally, this has meant that the 
federal courts have read societal race-neutrality not only as a social 
goal, but also as a premise of the legislation.233  In an attempt to move 
beyond the “issue” of race, the Court has put forward the belief that 
Title VII is meant to protect against the racial animus of individual 
                                                                                                                 
 226. Id. at 39-41. 
 227. Id. at 39. 
 228. Id. at 40. 
 229. Id. at 293 (“[O]ne of the pernicious effects of racism is that it often disables 
those whose interests do converge with people of color from fighting the structure 
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 230. See Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Colorblind Remedies and The 
Intersectionality of Oppression:  Policy Arguments Masquerading as Moral Claims, 
69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 162 (1994). 
 231. The antidiscrimination principle has traditionally been interpreted to mean 
that laws are designed to eliminate social and economic group privilege.  
 232. See supra Section II.A.1. 
 233. Culp, supra note 230. 
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employers operating within a just, un-stratified society, a fallacy that 
is not just legally impotent but also harmful.234  Indeed, if nothing 
else, the work of sociologists like Pager shows us that being marked 
with a criminal record while black is fundamentally different from 
being marked with a criminal record while white.  The federal courts’ 
“mythologies” of colorblindness work to maintain the status quo 
rather than implement change.235  Therefore, supplementing this 
legacy with race-neutral policy is to surrender to its assumptions and, 
ultimately, to the impossibility of the law’s capacity to improve the 
social and economic condition of racial minorities.  We need an 
effective ban-the-box program that ensures and promotes race 
conscious policy. 
This last point is fundamentally political and informed by the work 
of Harvard law professors Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres in The 
Miner’s Canary.236  The book is at the nexus of critical race theory 
and critical legal study, explaining how patterns that converge around 
race are often markers of systemic injustice that affects the 
underclass.237  According to the authors, race is a miner’s canary—this 
metaphor refers to an old miner’s practice of carrying canaries with 
them into the mines because the birds’ more fragile respiratory 
systems would cause their lungs to collapse from toxic gases before 
they affected humans, signaling danger.238  Guinier and Torres call for 
a “political race project,”239 to create an activist agenda founded on 
the principle of visibility.240  They argue that a colorblind approach to 
deeply entrenched social problems does not work; it only inhibits 
democratic engagement and reinforces existing power structures by 
managing the appearance of formal equality without considering the 
                                                                                                                 
 234. See supra Section II.A.1. 
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GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 221, at 17. 
 237. See id. 
 238. Id. at 11. 
 239. The “political race project” is a term developed by Guinier and Torres, 
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 240. Id. at 14-32. 
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consequences of real-world inequity and how the distribution of 
resources in society is racialized.241  Guinier and Torres show that this 
effort is distinct from past models—where conventional ideas of race 
were deliberately tied to issues of social policy “in order to make 
programs of general concern sound like special pleading”—instead, 
their movement encourages recognition of racialization as a source of 
power.242 
The political race project encourages legislators to acknowledge 
that the destructive market forces created by unemployment that rally 
political will for new ban-the-box laws are not set in motion by 
criminal record employment discrimination generally.  Rather, they 
are specifically brought about by racialized criminal record 
employment discrimination and the breakdown it points to in the 
country’s social fabric.  Political race project methodology is 
conducted in a two-step process.243  The first step—and the one called 
for in this Note to assess the impact of ban-the-box laws—is an 
engagement with the racial alert signal that emerges from a social 
problem.244  Only in the second step do advocates move beyond the 
diagnostic tool of the canary.245  There, the problem is considered in 
context, with an “expansive interpretation” based on more than racial 
factors and more than just the costs and benefits of a given social 
program.246  For ban-the-box, this means using the political energy 
focused on ending criminal record discrimination as an advancement 
of the racial civil rights agenda to eventually spark new conversations 
about the injustices in the so-called criminal justice system.  In this 
way, Guinier and Torres offer a sound structural solution to a 
structural problem.247  While the writers do not argue for a legislative 
application of their methodology, in regards to ban-the-box laws, the 
two steps could connect the prejudice felt by people of color with 
records to the language of a societal remedy with the power to 
recharacterize criminality generally and address its role in democratic 
and economic failures that affect all Americans.248  The potential uses 
for these politics are profound—like using ban-the-box legislation to 
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marshal resistance to building new prisons, connecting attempts to 
reduce collateral and direct consequences to their source. 
In sum, the ban-the-box movement demonstrates why criminal 
record discrimination is not incidentally race-related but, rather, 
situated within societal structures that reinforce oppression on the 
front and back end of criminal justice involvement.  At this relatively 
nascent stage of the laws, it is necessary to consider who is being 
erased by their language and how we might better orient these laws 
with a successful political tradition, if not a successful legislative one.  
The field of sociology lends important theories and strategies to 
approach this question by pointing to the signals of compounded 
racial and criminal history bias.  As the success of the laws is assessed 
going forward, race consciousness is necessary for the political and 
legal efficacy of reentry. 
III.  THE FAILURES OF EXISTING DATA ON BAN-THE-BOX 
This Part presents the empirical evaluations of the ban-the-box 
laws that government bodies and interested advocacy groups have 
conducted so far.  Half of the data is the result of Freedom of 
Information Law/Act (“FOIL” and “FOIA”) requests, while the rest 
have been published.  These studies are insufficient in both content 
and scope, and very little can be drawn from their conclusions beyond 
the necessity for more information.  This Part concludes by proposing 
that future ban-the-box laws promote data-collection systems 
modeled after the one used in San Francisco.  It also suggests ways in 
which the ban-the-box laws can be written to be more race conscious 
by incorporating “Purpose” sections into the laws. 
A. Ban-the-Box Data from Minneapolis, Durham, San Francisco, 
and New York City 
To date, the findings drawn from the assessments of ban-the-box 
laws have been extremely positive.  While these studies are 
encouraging, their results must be couched in a recognition of the 
limitations of this data collection so far and, specifically, of what has 
yet to be measured.  No evaluation was working with baseline data to 
demonstrate the climate of ex-offender hiring locally before the 
relevant ban-the-box law was implemented, and few measured 
changes over time, so it is impossible to determine from the research 
alone the impact of the legislation.  Further, only the 2011 New York 
City executive order, which is no longer in effect, implemented race 
data collection to monitor the effect of the law on people of color 
2017] ERASING THE MARK OF CAIN 1201 
with records.249  The studies raise questions about collection 
enforcement, the biased interests of the collectors themselves, and 
hidden or unmeasured variables.  Findings from studies conducted in 
Minneapolis, Durham, San Francisco, and New York City are 
presented below, in one place, to begin to look critically at what (and 
how much) is missing and to scrutinize the information that has been 
collected so far.  Each of the studies below have components that 
could inform a more effective future law that would impose stricter 
and more rigorous data collection for successful monitoring. 
1. Minneapolis, MN 
Minneapolis implemented its ban-the-box legislation, the Fair 
Hiring Practices Resolution, in December of 2006 for public 
employers and in compliance with the EEOC’s recommended 
criteria.250  The scope of this resolution expanded in stages.  In 2007 
the city removed the box on employment application materials asking 
about criminal history and then, in January of 2008, a revised 
background check policy went into effect.  The revision included 
stricter criteria for which positions required a background check and 
also mandated that the check be conducted only after a conditional 
offer was made.251  In July of 2008, the city’s Human Resources 
Department conducted a study measuring changes in background 
check practices following the implementation of the legislation. 
The findings of this study were presented in a public letter from 
City Council Member Elizabeth Glidden, who co-authored the 
resolution.  Glidden wrote in the letter:  “Today I confirm that, based 
on two years of results, this decision [to ban the box] has benefitted 
city government and residents with a criminal background.”252  The 
report shows that the number of background checks conducted 
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the population, which disproportionately impacts their families and communities.” Id.  
It is also important to recognize that a resolution, unlike an ordinance, is not binding 
law.  Instead, resolutions are generally used to provide policy direction, to set or 
amend operating policies and procedures, and to memorialize administrative actions. 
 251. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 19. 
 252. Letter from Elizabeth Glidden, City Council Member, to Mee Moua, St. 
Senator (Mar. 16, 2009), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Glidden-Ltr-
Minneapolis2004-2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZBH8-SH63]. 
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compared to the total number of applications dropped by only 1.5 
percent but that the number of applicants with past convictions hired 
compared to the total number of applicants who were flagged to have 
criminal histories or “concerns” increased by more than fifty 
percent.253  However, although the fraction of reviewed criminal 
histories leading to jobs increased since the resolution was passed, the 
number of people who were hired after their criminal histories were 
reviewed (“# of Applicants with Concerns Hired”) compared to the 
total number of applications (“Applications Received”) actually 
decreased from 0.3 percent to 0.2 percent.254  It is possible that this 
difference is due to the fact that fewer applicants had records, but that 
would seem unlikely given the increased incentive to apply provided 
by the new ban-the-box policy.  Therefore, the resolution seems to 
effectively restrict how public employers analyze criminal background 
checks but, ultimately, people with criminal records appear to have 
still faced discrimination by other, unmeasured means. 
2. Durham City and County, NC 
In 2014 the Southern Coalition for Social Justice, a nonprofit that 
aims to dismantle structural racism and oppression, published a 
report of a case study of Durham City and County’s ban-the-box 
legislations.255  In 2011 and 2012, respectively, Durham City256 and 
Durham County257 passed administrative policies that, like 
Minneapolis, applied to public employment and require both that the 
question about criminal history be removed from initial stages of the 
employment process and that the record check occur only after a 
conditional offer is made.258  The administrative policies also restrict 
which individuals in the City and County’s human resources 
departments can conduct a background check, in order to limit the 
number of people who come in contact with an individual’s record.259  
                                                                                                                 
 253. See infra App. B. 
 254. See infra App. B. 
 255. S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., THE BENEFITS OF BAN THE BOX:  A CASE STUDY OF 
DURHAM, NC (2014), http://www.southerncoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
BantheBox_WhitePaper-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/4MUT-SG4D]. 
 256. ALETHEA BELL, CITY OF DURHAM, N.C., BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS 
POLICY (Apr. 18, 2011), http://nelp.3cdn.net/2d995ad9f9d9a25923_wam6i22rt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S69V-Y7Z8]. 
 257. CTY. OF DURHAM, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE: CONDUCTING CRIMINAL 
BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS IN THE RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION PROCESS 
(2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/b1b8b051fc035c4153_3qm6b5isg.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8L68-BDMZ]. 
 258. NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 31, 39. 
 259. Id. 
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Applicants who are found to have records with a potential for adverse 
employment action are given seven days to challenge the record or 
present evidence of rehabilitation, and employers must use a 
balancing test—which takes into account the nature of the offense, 
time passed, and the relationship between the offense and the 
prospective job—in order to make a final decision.260 
According to the report, since the ban-the-box initiative began in 
2011, the overall proportion of people with criminal records hired by 
the City of Durham increased by nearly sevenfold.261  In Durham 
County ninety-six percent of the applicants with criminal records who 
were recommended for hire prior to the background check were 
ultimately hired.262  Further, at the time the report was published, 
none of the people with criminal records who were hired by the 
county had since been recorded as terminated because of illegal 
conduct.263  
The Durham data is interesting compared to that of Minneapolis 
because, while the requirements of the laws are nearly identical,264 
where Durham saw an increase in hires of people with records, 
Minneapolis saw only a reduction in discrimination based on the 
outcome of the criminal background checks.  This may be due to 
distinctions in geographic bias, but it could also be due to variance in 
advocacy and awareness efforts.  Again, further details and data are 
necessary to draw a firm conclusion from this discrepancy. 
3. San Francisco, CA 
As noted above, in 2014 San Francisco passed the Fair Chance 
Ordinance (“FCO”), which applies to both public and private 
employers.265  The FCO prohibits employers from asking about an 
applicant’s criminal history until after the first in-person interview.  
Its language incorporates the EEOC criteria about individualized 
assessment and provides a right for applicants to receive a copy of any 
background report and to appeal denial of employment.266  The 
                                                                                                                 
 260. Id. 
 261. See infra App. C; see also S. COAL. FOR SOC. JUST., supra note 255, at 6. 
 262. See infra App. C. 
 263. See infra App. C. Problematically, the collection means and source of this 
data are not specified in the study. 
 264. Except that the Minneapolis law evolved in stages, unlike the Durham law.  
This could potentially also influence the different impacts of the laws. 
 265. See NELP GUIDE, supra note 155, at 16-17. 
 266. S.F. POLICE CODE, ARTICLE 49:  PROCEDURES FOR CONSIDERING ARRESTS 
AND CONVICTION INFORMATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING DECISIONS (July 11, 
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ordinance also includes a specific provision regarding applications for 
affordable housing.267  San Francisco charges the Office of Labor 
Standards Enforcement (“OLSE”) with surveying San Francisco 
employers and, significantly, the FCO specifically mandates annual 
data collection by the OLSE to ensure compliance.268 
The OLSE collected ban-the-box data in 2015 in an annual survey 
that was originally designed to monitor the city’s Health Care 
Security Ordinance because the laws cover nearly identical employer 
populations.269  The survey designated six questions to determine the 
impact of the FCO during the period between August 13 and 
December 31 of 2014, addressing number of total hires, content of job 
applications, background checks, prohibited topics, changes made for 
compliance, and total hires with conviction histories.270  During 2014, 
private employers in San Francisco were under an implementation or 
“education period” when the OLSE was not authorized to impose 
any penalties for failure to comply, so the employers had little 
incentive to provide inaccurate information.271 
The survey recorded responses from 4732 employers ranging from 
local, small businesses with twenty employees to very large companies 
with over 500 employees (representing twenty-eight percent of the 
responses), from non-profit organizations (352 employers) to for-
profit businesses.  In total, the reporting employers recorded hiring 
68,667 employees during the measured period.  Nearly eighteen 
percent of respondents reported violating the requirement about 
removing the conviction question from application materials and 
                                                                                                                 
2014), http://sf-hrc.org/sites/default/files/ARTICLE%2049_%20Final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/X2M3-TWME]. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
(a) An Employer shall retain records of employment, application forms, and 
other pertinent data and records required under this Article, for a period of 
three years, and shall allow the OLSE access to such records, with 
appropriate notice and at a mutually agreeable time, to monitor compliance 
with the requirements of this Article. 
(b) An Employer shall provide information to the OLSE, or the OLSE’s 
designee, on an annual basis as may be required to verify the Employer’s 
compliance with this Article.  
Id. 
 269. REP. TO THE BD. OF SUPERVISORS, FAIR CHANCE HIRING IN SAN FRANCISCO:  
YEAR ONE OF THE SAN FRANCISCO FAIR CHANCE ORDINANCE (Jan. 29 2016), 
http://sfgov.org/olse/sites/default/files/FCO%20First%20Year%20Report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5W7V-84Q6]. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. 
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communications before the in-person interview, although some may 
have been in “exempt” industries, and seven percent did not 
respond.272  In contrast, almost ninety percent of the survey 
respondents reported not conducting a background check until after 
an in-person interview with almost identical results for the question 
asking about whether the employer avoided prohibited topics 
including arrests, expunged convictions, outdated convictions, etc.273  
Another question asked respondents whether they had changed their 
job application materials and process to comply with the FCO.  
About eighteen percent (851) of employers said that they changed 
their application process, while over fifty-one percent recorded 
already being in compliance and over fifteen percent claimed never to 
have checked conviction history.274  Finally, only three percent of 
employers recorded hiring anyone with a conviction history in 2014, 
with thirty-eight percent definitively answering that they had not 
hired any people with past convictions and fifty-three percent 
reporting that they did not know.275  Of the 398 employees with 
conviction histories hired, 345 were hired by for-profit companies and 
fifty-three were hired by nonprofit organizations. 
Looking more closely at those employers who hired workers with 
conviction histories, most reported hiring only one such employee.276  
Goodwill Industries was the highest employer of people with records 
at forty-one employees (out of 1999 total hires).277  Target and Cor-
O-Van Moving had the second highest employment counts for people 
with records at fifteen and sixteen people, respectively.278  
                                                                                                                 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. See also infra App. D.  The answers to this question are influenced by 
employers’ confusion about how to respond if other laws preempted them from 
removing conviction questions from their materials.  The FCO contains a preemption 
clause and the OLSE reported that during survey process several employers called to 
report that because of “preemption issues” they had not changed their application or 
background check process.  OLSE advised those callers to respond that their 
application was compliant.  However, because the survey did not offer guidance 
about how to answer the question in regards to preemption, “it cannot be determined 
what option other employers with preemption issues chose for their response.”  The 
OLSE plans to change this question to ask about preemption specifically in future 
surveys. 
 275. See infra App. E.  The response “I don’t know” may indicate that the 
employer did not inquire into conviction histories at all and therefore was not able to 
answer the question. REP. TO THE BD. OF SUPERVISORS, supra note 269. 
 276. S.F. Off. of Lab. Standards Enf’t, Fair Chance Act Data 2005 (unpublished 
report) (on file with author). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
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Interestingly, the majority of businesses that recorded hiring more 
than two people with criminal records (including the three employers 
hiring the largest number of ex-offenders) were also those who had 
reported changing their practices to comply with the law.279  This 
suggests that the act of engaging with the language of the law might 
have an impact on how it is implemented by employers. 
4. New York, NY 
Before New York City implemented the Fair Chance Act in June 
of 2015, which applies to public and private employers, the city’s first 
ban-the-box law was Executive Order 151, passed in 2011 by then-
Mayor Michael Bloomberg.  The order was part of Bloomberg’s 
Young Men’s Initiative (“YMI”), a campaign to “improve the lives of 
young black and Latino men in New York City.”280  Executive Order 
151 covered only public employers and served as a supplement to the 
failed enforcement of Article 23-A of New York Corrections Law.281  
Under 23-A, a candidate may only be denied employment if the 
conviction history is directly related to the job or poses an 
unreasonable risk based on certain factors, such as the time passed 
since the offense, or its severity.282  Beyond executing the provisions 
of 23-A, Executive Order 151 prohibited employers from asking 
applicants about conviction histories on any preliminary employment 
application documents and before or during the first job interview.  
While the remodeled Fair Chance Act of 2015 has no provision for 
data collection,283 the Executive Order charged the NYC Department 
of Citywide Administrative Services’ (“DCAS”) Human Capital 
Division with monitoring the effects of the law for two years and 
conducting “periodic operational reviews of agency practices.”284  The 
data that DCAS collected was never published.285 
                                                                                                                 
 279. Id. 
 280. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Citywide Admin. Servs., Executive Order 151 Data 2012 
(unpublished report) (on file with author) [hereinafter 2012 Executive Order 151 
Data]. 
 281. Michael R. Bloomberg, Executive Order 151, Consideration of Criminal 
Convictions in Hiring, NELP (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.nelp.org/content/
uploads/2015/03/NewYorkExecutiveOrder151.pdf [https://perma.cc/RCP2-N7P8]. 
 282. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753 (McKinney 2007) (listing eight statutory factors for 
employers to consider regarding an applicant’s conviction history). 
 283. See N.Y.C. Council, New York City Fair Chance Act Int. No. 318-A, NELP 
(June 10, 2015), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Fair-Chance-Act-NYC.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/B7NU-BN5U]. 
 284. See Bloomberg, supra note 281. 
 285. 2012 Executive Order 151 Data, supra note 280. 
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During the two-year monitoring period (2012 and 2013) an average 
of 51.9 percent of the thirty reporting New York City agencies (out of 
thirty-six total) hired people with criminal records.286  In 2012, 49.1 
percent of the thirty agencies hired ex-offenders, while the number 
jumped to 55.2 percent in 2013.287  Of those agencies that recorded 
hiring ex-offenders, people with records made up twelve percent of 
total hires in 2012 and twenty-four percent of total hires in 2014.288  
Although not mentioned in the report, these numbers may be high 
due to jobs added in public “non-competitive” fields in conjunction 
with the YMI that were, on the one hand, particularly suited to 
individuals with limited employment experience and skills and, on the 
other hand, nonpermanent.  The job titles with the highest hiring 
rates of individuals included “per diem job training participants” (59.4 
percent of the total hires for 2012 and 64.3 percent of the total hires for 
2013)289 and “lifeguard” (2.0 percent of total hires in 2012 and 2.1 
percent in 2013).290  While these positions may be easier to get with 
minimal qualifications, they also appear to be temporary or seasonal.  
Other seemingly nonpermanent jobs with high hiring rates included 
“city seasonal worker” and “city seasonal aide.”291 
The data from the New York City Executive Order 151 is unique 
because it did measure race and ethnic composition of the hired 
individuals with records.292  In 2012 60.4 percent of total hires with 
records were reported to be black and 15.7 percent were Hispanic; in 
2013, 67.7 percent of total hires with records were black and 17.6 
percent were Hispanic.293  These numbers are so high, and so 
dramatically inconsistent with studies like Pager’s, that the reporting 
measures and data variables used must be called into question.  
However, the study’s outlier findings may be due to the particular 
orientation of Executive Order 151 and its specific goal to improve 
lives of black and Latino men.  Still, it is also necessary to position 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Problematically, “per diem job training participant” is not defined in any of 
the City’s materials and is nowhere listed as a New York City job. 
 290. 2012 Executive Order 151 Data, supra note 280. 
 291. Id. 
 292. The New York law is one of the laws that has expressly designated racial 
discrimination as a purpose for implementing the ban-the-box law.  This factor makes 
the new law extremely viable and useful for determining whether race consciousness 
can affect the racial makeup of employees with records who are hired as a result of 
the law. See discussion, supra note 178. 
 293. See infra App. F. 
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Executive Order 151 within a criminal justice regime under Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg that boasted some of the city’s highest recidivism 
rates in history and such flagrant racial profiling in policing practices 
that they were found to violate the constitutional rights of New 
Yorkers of color.294  As the data stands—with insufficient background 
information and in a particularly racially hostile political context—it 
is difficult to give it much credence.  In particular, in order to analyze 
the study more effectively, it would be necessary to have additional 
details about who was getting allocated “temporary” or “provisional” 
positions versus permanent employment.  It is important to note that 
the New York City Fair Chance Act of 2015 is more substantive, 
lasting, and enforceable than Executive Order 151, as well as also 
applying to private employers; on top of that, its explicit purpose 
includes ameliorating the racial disparity in criminal record hiring 
discrimination.295 
5. Summary 
Together, these data collection efforts demonstrate that a wide 
span of information about the effects of ban-the-box laws can be 
collected through simple surveys of employers about their hiring 
practices.  While these efforts are insufficient individually, each study 
provides useful material for considering the importance of data 
collection and what still needs to be measured.  Even the uncertainty 
reflected in employers’ responses to the San Francisco survey 
questions is helpful, by signaling the need for improvement in 
outreach and awareness campaigns to better prepare the labor market 
when rolling out new legislation.  Further, the studies reflect a 
malleability in employer hiring practices that challenges the 
underlying principle of stasis in the sociological theory about 
organizations’ responses to employment discrimination legislation.  
Each study revealed different degrees of willingness by employers to 
adjust their hiring procedures to meet the requirements of ban-the-
box legislation.  The New York data even raises the potential that 
                                                                                                                 
 294. See Adam Peck, Mayor Bloomberg:  NYPD ‘Stops Whites Too Much and 
Minorities Too Little,’ THINK PROGRESS (June 28, 2013), http://thinkprogress.org/
justice/2013/06/28/2231761/mayor-bloomberg-nypd-stop-whites-too-much-and-
minorities-too-little/ [https://perma.cc/67L7-TP9C]; see also Floyd v. City of New 
York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding that the NYPD’s practices 
violated New Yorkers’ Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures and also finding that the practices were racially discriminatory 
in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  To 
remedy the widespread constitutional violations, the judge ordered a court-appointed 
monitor to oversee a series of reforms to NYPD policing practices. 
 295. See discussion, supra note 292. 
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legislation could be race specific.  What’s more, the findings of the 
San Francisco survey suggest that the process of reconsidering hiring 
practices through engagement with legislation can itself be a powerful 
motivating factor in implementing change.  That said, there are 
already signs of cosmetic compliance—for instance, in New York 
agencies’ relegation of ex-offenders to temporary labor positions.  It 
is clear that additional and more comprehensive data collection is 
essential to determining the real sources of change in employer hiring 
in order to better direct that change with future legislation. 
In total, these data collection efforts are conspicuously limited and 
infrequent.  All the studies show the potential for the laws to have a 
real impact on the hiring practices of employers in their consideration 
of applicants’ criminal histories, but none have taken the further step 
of exploring the nature of this impact and identifying the individuals 
that benefit from it.  In particular, the data is subject to the empirical 
pitfall of “omitted variable bias” because it fails to determine the 
experience of people of color with records in the new hiring arena 
(with the exception of the unreliable New York data) and how that 
invisible factor changes the results of the laws’ implementations.296  
Going forward, the laws should mandate data collection (like in San 
Francisco) by an equipped government body and measure not only 
the hiring rates of people with records generally, but, rather, the 
specific demographic makeup of those hires. 
B. A Proposal 
First, it is important to note that calling for race data collection is a 
policy not free from its own problematic context.  Such data 
collection has been viewed in multiple instances as a suspect practice, 
in violation of the antidiscrimination principle.297  Most recently, the 
contemporary civil rights movement has called attention to the use of 
race data to enforce criminal justice policies (e.g., “driving while 
                                                                                                                 
 296. ROBERT M. LAWLESS, JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & THOMAS S. ULEN, 
EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 324-25 (2010) (“Omitted variable bias arises when 
there is an explanatory or independent variable that has an influence on the 
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 297. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 
154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 941-42 (2006). 
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black” or “flying while brown”), as well as its use by the Census 
Bureau.298  In light of that critique, the mode of data collection called 
for in this Note is intended to fit the category of research that 
measures a racial phenomenon, rather than constructing one.  
Second, empirical data alone cannot provide a complete picture of the 
impact of ban-the-box legislation on racial minorities with records.  
Understanding how employers make decisions and participate in the 
construction of prejudice requires qualitative and theoretical study, 
too.  Still, empirics are useful for the overall analysis of this Note, 
because they encourage visibility by measuring the links between 
social phenomena that, while structurally present, are often hidden. 
Additional questions about potential issues with the 
implementation of data collection still remain.  Who is best positioned 
to collect the data?  Who will enforce that collection?  Also, the most 
effective use of this data by claimants and courts remains to be 
determined. 
This Note proposes that future ban-the-box laws require data 
collection, following in the model of the San Francisco FCO.299  The 
data should directly address the races of ex-offenders who are hired in 
order to determine if minorities are benefiting from the 
implementation of ban-the-box laws.  This collection should be at 
least annual and conducted by a relevant and competent government 
office or agency, either in conjunction with an enforcement body or 
with the power to enforce the laws itself.  The purpose of this data 
collection should be transparently conveyed in order to reinforce to 
employers the goals of the laws and how assessments relate to those 
goals.  In order to facilitate and regulate the retrieval and 
measurement of empirical material by a variety of officials across the 
country, the EEOC should issue guidance recommending and 
demonstrating successful data collection.300  Finally, and perhaps most 
                                                                                                                 
 298. Id. at 942. 
 299. The relevant section of the San Francisco ordinance reads as follows: 
Pursuant to its rulemaking authority under this Article, the OLSE shall 
adopt rules that establish procedures for Employers to maintain and retain 
accurate records and to provide annual reporting of compliance to OLSE in 
a manner that does not require disclosure of any information that would 
violate State or Federal privacy laws.  
S.F. POLICE CODE, supra note 266. 
 300. The EEOC could also collect the data itself.  Recently, the EEOC issued a 
proposal to amend the Employer Information Report (“EEO-1”) for all employers 
with more than one hundred employees to “include collecting pay data from 
employers.” U.S. EEOC, Press Release, EEOC Announces Proposed Addition of 
Pay Data to Annual EE-1 Reports (Jan. 29, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/
eeoc/newsroom/release/1-29-16.cfm [https://perma.cc/K6H4-43LK].  EEO-1 data 
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importantly, ban-the-box laws should be written to be more race 
conscious by incorporating “Purpose” sections that address the 
disparate treatment of people of color by the criminal justice system 
and then by employers post-conviction.  This will guide employers to 
conceive of compliance with ban-the-box laws in a way that reflects 
the true purpose of the legislation:  ameliorating structural inequality 
and prejudice in the labor market. 
CONCLUSION 
The racially discriminatory practices of the criminal justice system 
have facilitated structural inequality in the labor market through the 
negative credential of the criminal record.  Thus far, efforts to use 
Title VII to ameliorate this problem have been disempowered by the 
federal courts’ skepticism of the persistence of race as source of social 
and economic disadvantage in America.  This legislative and judicial 
failure, the rise of the criminal background check industry, and 
compounded racial prejudice about criminality have led to a national 
effort to advance ban-the-box laws.  As the country rallies behind 
these new laws, it is necessary to improve their efficacy by considering 
their legal legacy and implementing race-conscious legislation. 
The laws going forward should mandate data collection about the 
race of hires with criminal histories.  They should also include 
“Purpose” sections that address the issue of employers’ disparate 
treatment of racial minorities with records as a result of structural 
inequality perpetuated by the criminal justice system.  Ban-the-box 
laws are the product of a movement that has seen the miner’s canary 
struggling to breathe; now is not the time to shut our eyes. 
  
                                                                                                                 
provides the federal government with workforce profiles from private sector federal 
employers by race, ethnicity, sex, and job category.  The January 2016 proposal, while 
specifically addressing wages, signifies the EEOC’s recognition of empirical data as a 
successful means to spot “trends” in discrimination.  If the EEOC measured the 
hiring rates of ex-offenders and their races it would create a substantial amount of 
data for activists and legislators working on ban-the-box laws. 
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APPENDIX B302 
Applicant Summary 2004-2006 2007-July 3, 2008 
Applications Received-City Positions 
Only 
18,842 12,911 
# of Background Checks Conducted303 996 (5.3% of total 
applications) 
494 (3.8% of total 
applications) 
# of Background Checks with 
Convictions Concerns 
N/A 47 
% of Applicants with Conviction 
Concerns304 
 9.5% 
# of Applicants with Concerns Hired 57 (5.7%)305 27 (57.4%) 
# of Applications Rejected Prior to an 
Eligible List Being Established 
51 (5.1%) None306 
# of Applicants Rejected for not 
responding to a convictions letter 
41 (4.1%) 1 (2.1%) 
# of Applicants rejected due to the 
nature of the conviction (post-
certification)307 
2 (0.2%) 13 (27.7%) 
  
                                                                                                                 
 302. City of Durham, supra note 257. 
 303. “2004-2006 reflects the number of applicant-disclosed convictions for 
permanent hires, not the number of background checks conducted through a third-
party vendor.  2007-2008 reflects the number of background checks conducted 
through a third-party vendor for all applicable details, temporary and permanent 
hires.” Letter from Elisabeth Glidden, supra note 252, at 3 n.1. 
 304. “For 2004-2006, all disclosed conviction information was reviewed.  There is 
no specific data available for how many of those disclosures had ‘concerns.’” Id. at 3 
n.2. 
 305. “Percentages are the ratio of applicant status to the number of background 
checks conducted (2004-2007), or the number of checks with concerns (2007-2008).” 
Id. at 3 n.3. 
 306. “As of 1/30/07, background checks [were] only conducted after a conditional 
job offer had been made.” Id. at 3 n.4. 
 307. “2004-2006 numbers are lower as rejections were typically done prior to 
certification.  2007-2008 rejection percentages are higher as it is compared only to the 
number of checks with a concern (47).” Id. at 3 n.5. 
















Did you change your job application process 




Yes, we changed our application and /or 
background check process 
845 17.9% 
No our existing application and/or 
background check process was already 
compliant with the law 
2,432 51.4% 
No, we never considered arrest records or 
convictions, and we still do not 
728 15.4% 
No, we have not yet changed out process to 
comply with the law 
99 2.0% 
Total: 4,104*  
Note:  Due to a technical problem, 628 online surveys had no usable data in 
response to Question 5. 
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2011 2012 2013 2014
Percentage By Public Employers in Durham City, 
NC of New Hires With Criminal Records From 
2011-2014
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APPENDIX E310 
Did you hire anyone with a conviction history between August 
13, 2014 and December 31, 2014? 
Yes 135 3% 
No 1,776 38% 
Don’t know 2,490 53% 
No response 331 7% 




Recorded in the Citywide Administrative Services Report on 
Citywide Diversity and Equal Employment Opportunity 
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Race/Ethnicity Composition of Hired Indviduals With 
Conviction Records in 2012 and 2013
2012 2013
